CSS 2025Current AffairsQ. 5
Discuss the major contours of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and discuss the prospects of their success/failure with reference to India-United States Strategic Partnership.
#cssnexusBy CSS Nexus ·
This is a model answer to the CSS 2025 Current Affairs paper (Q. 5), prepared by the CSS Nexus team for practice. Read the outline first, then see how each point is developed.
Outline
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Major contours of the regime
- ✓NPT (1968): three pillars
- ✓IAEA safeguards
- ✓CTBT; nuclear-weapon-free zones
- ✓Export controls: NSG, MTCR, Wassenaar, Australia Group
- ✓TPNW (2017)
- 3. Successes
- 4. Weaknesses
- 5. The India–US strategic partnership
- ✓2005 joint statement; 123 Agreement (2008); NSG waiver
- ✓Membership of export-control regimes; NSG bid
- 6. Implications for the regime and for Pakistan
- 7. Prospects
- 8. Conclusion
Answer
Introduction
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is a network of treaties, institutions and export controls designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons while allowing peaceful use of nuclear energy. Its credibility depends on consistent application. The India–US strategic partnership, which brought India — a non-signatory of the NPT — into mainstream nuclear commerce, is often cited as a major test of the regime.
Major contours
The NPT (1968, in force 1970) rests on three pillars: non-proliferation (non-nuclear states do not acquire weapons), disarmament (nuclear-weapon states pursue disarmament under Article VI) and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Only five states — the US, Russia, UK, France and China — are recognised as nuclear-weapon states. India, Pakistan and Israel never joined; North Korea announced its withdrawal in 2003.
IAEA safeguards verify that nuclear material is not diverted to weapons. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) has not entered into force. Export-control regimes include the Nuclear Suppliers Group (formed in 1975 after India's 1974 test), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. Nuclear-weapon-free zones cover large parts of the world, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017) bans nuclear weapons for its parties, though no nuclear-armed state has joined.
Successes
Far fewer states have nuclear weapons than predicted in the 1960s; several states abandoned programmes (South Africa, Libya, Brazil and Argentina); safeguards have built confidence; and the norm against nuclear testing is strong.
Weaknesses
Slow disarmament by nuclear-weapon states has frustrated non-nuclear states; non-signatories remain outside the treaty; North Korea's withdrawal and tests and the Iranian dispute have tested the system; and the regime is applied selectively according to the strategic interests of major powers.
The India–US strategic partnership
In July 2005 President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed on civil nuclear cooperation. India separated its civilian and military facilities and placed civilian ones under IAEA safeguards; the 123 Agreement was concluded in 2008, and the NSG granted India a waiver in September 2008, allowing nuclear trade despite India remaining outside the NPT. The US has since supported India's entry into the export-control regimes; India joined the MTCR (2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and the Australia Group (2018). Its bid for NSG membership remains blocked, partly because China insists on criteria applicable to all non-NPT states.
Implications
Critics argue that the deal undermined the regime by rewarding a state that tested nuclear weapons outside the NPT, allowing imported fuel to free India's own uranium for military use, and setting a precedent of exceptions based on strategic interest. It reinforced the perception of discrimination: Pakistan, also a non-NPT nuclear state, was denied similar treatment. Pakistan has called for a criteria-based, non-discriminatory approach to NSG membership and warned that such exceptions destabilise strategic stability in South Asia. Supporters argue that the deal brought India's civilian programme under safeguards and aligned it with non-proliferation norms.
Prospects
The regime is likely to survive because most states benefit from it, but its legitimacy is weakened by selective application, stalled disarmament and great-power rivalry. If geopolitical considerations continue to override rules — as in the India–US partnership aimed at balancing China — other states may question the fairness of the system. Success will depend on reviving disarmament talks, entry into force of the CTBT, and a consistent, criteria-based approach to non-NPT states.
Conclusion
The non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, but its credibility depends on fairness and consistency. The India–US nuclear partnership illustrates how strategic interests can create exceptions that weaken the regime and fuel regional imbalances. A rules-based, non-discriminatory approach is essential for its long-term success.
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