How would you describe the criminological reasons behind the rise of misinformation and disinformation, especially during political conflicts?

Introduction

Misinformation is false information shared without intent to deceive; disinformation is false information deliberately created and spread to mislead. During political conflicts — elections, protests, wars — both multiply, often with serious consequences such as violence, loss of trust and manipulation of public opinion. Criminology helps explain why people produce and spread such content and why controls fail.

Why conflicts breed false information

Conflicts create uncertainty, fear and strong group identities. People seek quick explanations and trust sources from their own side. States, parties and interest groups use information as a weapon, and the demand for sensational content rises.

Criminological explanations

Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson) says crime occurs when a motivated offender meets a suitable target in the absence of a capable guardian. Online, motivated propagandists meet millions of polarised, emotionally engaged users, while platform moderation and law enforcement act as weak guardians.

Rational choice. Spreading disinformation offers political gain, money from clicks and advertising, or influence, at very low risk of detection or punishment, especially through anonymous accounts and cross-border operations.

Social learning and differential association (Sutherland, Akers). People learn to share false content from peers and online groups that reward it with likes and approval; repeated exposure normalises it.

Techniques of neutralisation (Sykes and Matza). Spreaders justify their actions: "everyone does it", "the other side lies more", "it is for a good cause", or "I only shared it".

Strain and anomie (Merton, Durkheim). Political and economic frustration, distrust of institutions and blocked opportunities push people towards conspiracy narratives and deviant forms of expression.

Moral panic and labelling (Stanley Cohen). Media and political actors exaggerate threats from "folk devils", creating panic that fuels further false stories; at the same time, labelling all dissent as "fake news" can be used to suppress legitimate speech.

Facilitating factors

Algorithms that reward engagement amplify emotional and divisive content; encrypted messaging spreads rumours beyond public view; bots and coordinated networks create the illusion of consensus; and generative AI makes it cheap to produce convincing fake text, images and videos.

Harms

Disinformation can incite communal and mob violence, undermine electoral credibility, damage reputations, endanger public health (as with vaccine myths) and erode trust in media and the state. In Pakistan, false blasphemy allegations and rumours on social media have led to deadly violence.

Prevention and response

Responses should combine capable guardians with respect for free speech: platform transparency and rapid takedown of coordinated inauthentic behaviour; independent fact-checking; digital and media literacy education; clear, narrowly defined laws against deliberate harmful falsehoods; and trustworthy official communication. Pakistan's Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, amended in 2025 to create offences relating to false information and a social media regulatory authority, must be applied transparently so that it targets deliberate disinformation rather than criticism and dissent.

Conclusion

Misinformation and disinformation rise during political conflicts because motivated actors, receptive audiences and weak guardians converge in the digital space, and because people learn and justify such behaviour. Effective control requires addressing opportunity, motivation and trust together — through technology, education, fair laws and credible institutions.