How far the nature of center province relations has changed under various amendments to the 1973 constitution? Evaluate.

Introduction

K. C. Wheare defined federalism in Federal Government (1946) as "the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent." The 1973 Constitution promised such a federation, yet for most of its life the balance tilted towards the centre. Amendments made under military rulers concentrated power in Islamabad, while those made by consensus in democratic periods restored provincial autonomy. The story of centre-province relations is thus the story of the Constitution's amendments, and it shows a clear but incomplete shift from a centralised to a more genuinely federal state.

Overview

The original 1973 Constitution created a bicameral federal legislature, a Federal Legislative List and a Concurrent List of 47 subjects on which both levels could legislate, with federal law prevailing in conflict. It established the Council of Common Interests, the National Finance Commission and the National Economic Council, and gave provinces net hydel profits and gas royalties. However, the Concurrent List, emergency powers and the centre's control over taxation left the provinces weak, and the promise to review the Concurrent List after ten years was never implemented until 2010.

How amendments changed centre-province relations

1. The early amendments (1974-1976).

The First Amendment (1974) recognised Bangladesh and adjusted territorial provisions, while others extended emergency-era powers and limited judicial review. In this period the federal government dismissed the Balochistan government (1973) and banned the NAP (1975), showing that constitutional federalism was weak in practice. (Reference: Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1974; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan, PLD 1976 SC 57.)

2. The Eighth Amendment (1985).

Passed under Zia-ul-Haq, it inserted Article 58(2)(b) and gave the President discretion to appoint governors and dissolve assemblies; parallel powers under Article 112(2)(b) let governors dissolve provincial assemblies. This made provincial governments dependent on the President. (Reference: Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act 1985.)

3. The Thirteenth Amendment (1997).

Under Nawaz Sharif, Parliament removed the President's and governors' discretionary power to dissolve assemblies, restoring the authority of elected federal and provincial governments. (Reference: Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act 1997.)

4. The Seventeenth Amendment (2003).

Under Musharraf, it revived presidential and gubernatorial dissolution powers, validated the Legal Framework Order and kept the centre dominant, although Musharraf's Local Government Ordinance 2001 bypassed provinces by creating district governments. (Reference: Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 2003; Legal Framework Order 2002.)

5. The Eighteenth Amendment (2010): legislative devolution.

It abolished the Concurrent List, transferred subjects such as education, health, labour and environment to provinces and created Part II of the Federal List under the CCI. It also removed Article 58(2)(b) and 112(2)(b) and renamed NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (Reference: Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act 2010; Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms, 2010.)

6. The Eighteenth Amendment: fiscal and resource devolution. Article 160(3A) protected provincial shares in the NFC, Article 172(3) gave provinces joint ownership of oil and gas, provinces gained the right to collect sales tax on services and to borrow within NEC limits, and the CCI was strengthened with a secretariat and a 90-day meeting requirement. (Reference: Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 153-154, 160(3A), 167(4) and 172(3).)

7. The Nineteenth to Twenty-fifth Amendments.

The Nineteenth (2011) adjusted judicial appointments; the Twentieth (2012) created caretaker governments through consultation with the opposition at both levels; and the Twenty-fifth (2018) merged FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, extending provincial authority over the tribal areas. (Reference: Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act 2012; Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act 2018.)

8. The Twenty-sixth Amendment (2024).

It created constitutional benches in the Supreme Court and high courts and changed the process for appointing the Chief Justice, issues that affect how centre-province disputes are adjudicated. (Reference: Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act 2024.)

Evaluation: how far the nature of relations has changed

1. Formal autonomy has expanded greatly.

The pendulum swung from centralisation under military-era amendments to the most decentralised arrangement in Pakistan's history after 2010. Provinces now control most domestic policy and over half of national revenues. (Reference: Raza Rabbani, A Biography of Pakistani Federalism: Unity in Diversity, Leo Books, 2012.)

2. Fiscal dependence persists.

Provinces still collect very little of their own revenue and rely on federal transfers for most of their budgets, so the centre retains financial leverage. (Reference: Finance Division, Pakistan Economic Survey 2023-24, chapter on fiscal development.)

3. The CCI's uneven performance.

The CCI has often failed to meet every 90 days and has delayed decisions, such as on the census and water, limiting cooperative federalism. (Reference: Constitution of Pakistan, Article 154(3); CCI meeting records.)

4. Political centralisation through parties and courts.

Centralised national parties, the role of the security establishment and the use of federal agencies continue to shape provincial politics, so the practice of federalism lags behind the text of the Constitution. (Reference: Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan, Harvard University Press, 2014.)

Conclusion

The Preamble declares that the units of the federation "will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed." Over five decades, amendments under military rulers eroded this promise, while democratic amendments, above all the Eighteenth, restored it. Today the constitutional nature of centre-province relations has changed fundamentally, from a centralised structure to a federation of empowered provinces. Yet fiscal dependence, an underused CCI and political centralisation show that the change is incomplete. Implementing the spirit of the Eighteenth Amendment, through a new NFC Award, regular CCI meetings and empowered local governments, is the next step.