What impact global climate change will have on the water resources of Pakistan? How will it affect inter-provincial harmony?

Introduction

Benjamin Franklin wrote in Poor Richard's Almanack (1746): "When the well's dry, we know the worth of water." Pakistan is close to learning that lesson. Almost its entire agriculture, much of its electricity and the lives of over 240 million people depend on the Indus River system, fed by Himalayan, Karakoram and Hindu Kush glaciers and the monsoon. Climate change is disturbing both sources, bringing floods one year and droughts the next. Because water in Pakistan is shared among provinces under a delicate accord, any change in its availability also tests the unity of the federation.

Overview

The Indus and its tributaries provide around 145 million acre-feet (MAF) of water a year on average, irrigating one of the world's largest contiguous irrigation systems. Pakistan's per capita water availability has fallen from about 5,000 cubic metres in 1951 to around 1,000 cubic metres, the threshold of water scarcity, because of population growth. Pakistan can store only about 30 days of river flow in its major reservoirs. The Water Apportionment Accord of 1991 distributes water among the provinces, and the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), created in 1992, implements it. The National Water Policy of 2018, approved by the Council of Common Interests, called water security a national priority.

Impact of climate change on Pakistan's water resources

1. Glacier melt and long-term decline.

Warming will accelerate glacier melt, increasing river flows for some decades before they decline. Even if warming is limited to 1.5°C, about one-third of the glaciers of the Hindu Kush Himalaya could be lost by 2100. (Reference: ICIMOD, The Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment, 2019; ICIMOD, Water, Ice, Society, and Ecosystems in the Hindu Kush Himalaya, 2023.)

2. Erratic monsoons.

Climate change makes monsoon rains more intense and less predictable, with long dry spells followed by extreme downpours that are hard to store or use. (Reference: IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group I, 2021, South Asia chapter; Pakistan Meteorological Department reports.)

3. Floods and glacial lake outburst floods.

The floods of 2010 and 2022 were among the worst in Pakistan's history, and more than 3,000 glacial lakes in the north pose a risk of outburst floods, such as the one that destroyed the Hassanabad bridge in May 2022. (Reference: UNDP Pakistan, GLOF-II project; Government of Pakistan, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment 2022.)

4. More frequent droughts.

Rising temperatures and lower rainfall increase drought risk in Balochistan, Sindh and southern Punjab, as in the severe drought of 1998–2002 and recurring droughts in Thar. (Reference: National Disaster Management Authority, drought reports; World Bank, Pakistan Country Climate and Development Report, 2022.)

5. Higher demand from heat.

Hotter temperatures increase evaporation from reservoirs and canals and the water needs of crops, people and livestock, widening the gap between supply and demand. (Reference: World Bank, Pakistan: Getting More from Water, 2019.)

6. Sea intrusion in the Indus Delta.

Reduced river flows below Kotri, combined with sea-level rise, have allowed seawater to intrude into the delta, destroying farmland and mangroves in Thatta and Badin. (Reference: IUCN Pakistan, studies on the Indus Delta; Water Apportionment Accord 1991, paragraph 7 on escapages below Kotri.)

7. Groundwater depletion.

As surface water becomes unreliable, farmers pump more groundwater, and water tables are falling rapidly in Punjab and Balochistan. (Reference: Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) reports; World Bank, Pakistan: Getting More from Water, 2019.)

8. Sedimentation and storage loss.

Heavier rains and floods carry more sediment, reducing the capacity of Tarbela and Mangla reservoirs, and making new storage more urgent. (Reference: WAPDA, reservoir sedimentation surveys; National Water Policy 2018.)

Effects on inter-provincial harmony

1. Disputes under the 1991 Accord.

When flows fall short, provinces dispute how shortages should be shared, whether by historical use or by the Accord's paragraph 2 allocations, and IRSA's decisions are often contested. (Reference: Water Apportionment Accord 1991, paragraphs 2 and 14; IRSA Act 1992.)

2. Upstream-downstream mistrust.

Sindh, as the lower riparian, fears that Punjab takes more water upstream, while Punjab argues that Sindh wastes water. Scarcity sharpens these suspicions. (Reference: Senate Standing Committee on Water Resources proceedings; Dawn reports on IRSA disputes.)

3. Controversy over dams. Kalabagh Dam remains blocked by opposition from Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whose assemblies have passed resolutions against it, while Punjab supports it. Climate change raises the need for storage but also the stakes of such disputes. (Reference: resolutions of the Provincial Assemblies of Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa against Kalabagh Dam; WAPDA project documents.)

4. New canals controversy.

In 2025, plans for new canals to irrigate Cholistan triggered protests across Sindh, and the Council of Common Interests decided on 28 April 2025 that no new canal would be built without the consensus of all provinces. (Reference: Council of Common Interests, decision of 28 April 2025; Prime Minister's Office press release.)

5. Water accounting and theft allegations.

The absence of a reliable telemetry system allows provinces to accuse each other of under-reporting withdrawals, eroding trust. (Reference: IRSA, telemetry system reports; World Bank, Pakistan Water Sector Strategy.)

6. Balochistan's grievances.

Balochistan often complains that it does not receive its full share under the Accord because of inadequate canal capacity and upstream withdrawals. (Reference: statements of the Balochistan government at IRSA and the Council of Common Interests.)

7. Burden of floods.

Floods often hit Sindh and Balochistan hardest, and disputes arise over breaching embankments to protect certain areas and over the sharing of relief and reconstruction funds. (Reference: Post-Disaster Needs Assessment 2022; Federal Flood Commission reports.)

8. Politicisation and sub-nationalism.

Water disputes are used by political and nationalist groups to mobilise provincial sentiment, feeding the perception that the federation is unfair. (Reference: PILDAT, briefing papers on inter-provincial water issues; Council of Common Interests records.)

Way forward

Pakistan needs to build new storage, such as Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand dams, through consensus; install a transparent telemetry system; implement the National Water Policy 2018; line canals and promote drip and sprinkler irrigation; regulate groundwater; restore the Indus Delta with agreed minimum flows below Kotri; invest in flood early warning and GLOF protection; and use the Council of Common Interests as the forum for all water disputes. Climate finance and the Living Indus initiative can support these measures.

Conclusion

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned in 2001: "Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future." For Pakistan, the danger lies not only across borders but within its own federation. Climate change will make Pakistan's water more unpredictable and scarce, testing the 1991 Accord and the trust among provinces. If Pakistan manages water efficiently, transparently and by consensus, it can turn a source of division into a bond that holds the federation together.