Discuss in detail the efficacy of counter terrorism measures adopted by the government, especially with reference to the National Action Plan.

Introduction

Speaking at the United Nations on her sixteenth birthday in July 2013, Malala Yousafzai said: "They thought that the bullets would silence us. But they failed." By then, terrorism had killed tens of thousands of Pakistanis, attacked schools, mosques, markets and military bases, and threatened the writ of the state. From 2014, Pakistan adopted a series of counter-terrorism measures, culminating in the National Action Plan (NAP) after the Peshawar school massacre of December 2014. By 2016, terrorist violence had fallen sharply, showing the efficacy of these measures, but important gaps remained that threatened to undo the gains.

Overview

Pakistan's first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) was announced in February 2014. Talks with the TTP failed, and after the attack on Karachi airport in June 2014, the army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan on 15 June 2014. Parliament passed the Protection of Pakistan Act in July 2014. After the Army Public School attack on 16 December 2014, the government lifted the moratorium on the death penalty and announced the 20-point NAP on 24 December 2014, followed by the 21st Amendment in January 2015 establishing military courts. A paramilitary-led operation in Karachi, begun in September 2013, continued alongside.

Counter-terrorism measures and their efficacy

1. National Internal Security Policy 2014.

The NISP set out a "comprehensive response" combining dialogue, deterrence and capacity-building, and proposed a joint intelligence directorate under NACTA. It gave direction but was only partly implemented. (Reference: Ministry of Interior, National Internal Security Policy 2014–2018, February 2014.)

2. Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

The operation cleared North Waziristan, the main sanctuary of the TTP and foreign militants, destroying their command structures and bomb-making facilities. It was highly effective in denying terrorists territory. (Reference: ISPR statements on Zarb-e-Azb, 2014–2016.)

3. The Protection of Pakistan Act 2014.

The Act gave security forces wider powers of arrest and detention and created special courts for terrorism, though rights groups criticised its broad provisions. (Reference: Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights 2014.)

4. The National Action Plan.

NAP created a national consensus and a single framework covering military, legal, financial and ideological measures, with apex committees in each province to coordinate implementation. (Reference: National Action Plan, 24 December 2014; Ministry of Interior progress reports, 2015–2016.)

5. Military courts and the death penalty.

The 21st Amendment created military courts for two years and executions resumed; hundreds of terrorists were tried. This produced deterrence but raised concerns about due process. (Reference: Constitution (Twenty-first Amendment) Act, 2015; Supreme Court of Pakistan judgment upholding the amendment, August 2015.)

6. The Karachi operation.

The Rangers-led operation sharply reduced target killings, extortion and terrorism in Karachi, restoring economic activity in the country's commercial hub. (Reference: Sindh Home Department; Citizens-Police Liaison Committee crime statistics, 2013–2016.)

7. Intelligence-based operations and CTDs.

Thousands of intelligence-based operations across the country and the strengthening of provincial Counter Terrorism Departments disrupted urban terrorist networks. (Reference: NACTA and Ministry of Interior statements, 2015–2016; Punjab CTD annual reports.)

8. De-radicalisation programmes.

Centres such as Sabaoon in Swat, run by the army with civil society, rehabilitated former child militants, offering a model of soft counter-terrorism. (Reference: Sabaoon Rehabilitation Centre, Swat; studies by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.)

Overall efficacy.

The combined effect was striking: according to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, terrorist attacks fell from about 1,717 in 2013 to about 441 in 2016, and deaths fell by more than half. (Reference: PIPS, Pakistan Security Reports, 2013 and 2016.)

Gaps that limit efficacy

1. Weak civilian capacity.

Police, prosecution and civil administration remained under-resourced, so military gains were not always followed by effective civilian control. (Reference: International Crisis Group, Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls, July 2015.)

2. Low conviction rates.

Ordinary anti-terrorism courts convicted only a small share of suspects because of weak investigation, witness intimidation and poor forensics. (Reference: Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan; Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 case data.)

3. Incomplete madrassa reform.

Registration and regulation of madrassas, a key NAP point, moved slowly because of resistance and federal-provincial confusion. (Reference: National Action Plan, point 10; Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat-ul-Madaris statements.)

4. Persistence of sectarian groups.

Some banned sectarian organisations continued to operate under new names, undermining NAP's promise of zero tolerance. (Reference: NACTA, list of proscribed organisations; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reports.)

5. Displacement and reconstruction in FATA.

Zarb-e-Azb displaced around a million people from North Waziristan; slow return and rebuilding risked new grievances. (Reference: UN OCHA Pakistan, Humanitarian Snapshot on temporarily displaced persons, 2014–2016; FATA Disaster Management Authority.)

6. The Afghan dimension.

Militants fled across the border into Afghanistan, from where they continued to launch attacks, and border management remained weak. (Reference: ISPR statements, 2015–2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements.)

7. Financing and hawala.

Action against terror financing was limited before FATF pressure, allowing groups to keep raising funds through charities and hawala. (Reference: APG, Mutual Evaluation Report of Pakistan, 2019; NAP, point 6.)

8. Uneven provincial ownership.

Provinces implemented NAP at different speeds, and the absence of a strong coordinating NACTA reduced overall coherence. (Reference: Senate Standing Committee on Interior proceedings, 2015–2016; NACTA Act, 2013.)

Conclusion

After the victory at El Alamein in November 1942, Winston Churchill said: "Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning." The same could be said of Pakistan's counter-terrorism campaign in 2016. Zarb-e-Azb, the Karachi operation and NAP had broken the momentum of terrorism and restored the state's writ, proving their efficacy. But without stronger police and courts, madrassa reform, action on terror financing and sectarian groups, and a secure western border, the gains would remain fragile, as the resurgence after 2021 later showed.