(a) Analyze the effects of commissioning of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), INS Arihant equipped with nuclear-capable missile called K-4 over the strategic stability of South Asia. (b) US-India in August 2016 signed Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) that will reportedly facilitate the two allies to use each other's military facilities to check China's growing influence. Comment.

(a) INS Arihant, the K-4 missile and strategic stability in South Asia

Bernard Brodie wrote in The Absolute Weapon (1946): "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them." Nuclear submarines are meant to serve that purpose by guaranteeing a survivable second strike. India's commissioning of INS Arihant, its first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), completed its "nuclear triad", but its effects on South Asia's strategic stability are mixed and, for Pakistan, worrying.

Background.

INS Arihant was launched in 2009 and quietly commissioned in 2016; India announced its first deterrence patrol in November 2018. It can carry K-15 (Sagarika) missiles with a range of about 750 km or a smaller number of K-4 missiles with a range of about 3,500 km. A second SSBN, INS Arighaat, was commissioned in 2024.

(a) Effects on strategic stability

1. A secure second strike for India.

An SSBN at sea is hard to destroy, so India gains an assured second-strike capability, which some argue stabilises deterrence by removing fears of a disarming first strike. (Reference: Prime Minister's Office of India, statement on INS Arihant's deterrence patrol, 5 November 2018; Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper, 1981.)

2. Reach beyond Pakistan.

The K-4's range allows India to target China from the Bay of Bengal, showing that India's sea-based deterrent is aimed mainly at China, but it also covers all of Pakistan. (Reference: SIPRI Yearbook 2025, India's nuclear forces; Federation of American Scientists, Indian Nuclear Weapons, 2024.)

3. Arms race with Pakistan.

Pakistan responded by testing the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile in January 2017, starting its own sea-based deterrent and intensifying competition. (Reference: ISPR, Babur-3 test, 9 January 2017.)

4. Nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean.

Nuclear-armed submarines bring nuclear competition to the Indian Ocean, a busy trade route, raising the risk of incidents at sea. (Reference: Iskander Rehman, Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean, Carnegie Endowment, 2015.)

5. Command and control concerns.

Keeping missiles ready on submarines may require pre-delegation of launch authority or mated warheads, which could weaken central control and raise the risk of unauthorised use. (Reference: Carnegie Endowment and SIPRI analyses on Indian sea-based deterrence, 2016–2020.)

6. Crisis instability.

In a crisis, the presence of nuclear submarines at sea may create pressure to act quickly, and anti-submarine operations against them could be seen as threatening the nuclear deterrent. (Reference: James Acton (ed.), Entanglement, Carnegie Endowment, 2017.)

7. Safety risks.

Indian media reported that INS Arihant was damaged in 2017 when a hatch was left open and water entered its propulsion section, highlighting the risks of operating new nuclear submarines. (Reference: The Hindu, report of 8 January 2018.)

8. Pressure on Pakistan's resources.

Matching India's sea-based deterrent strains Pakistan's limited budget, adding to the costs of an already expensive rivalry. (Reference: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; Pakistan Navy modernisation plans.)

Conclusion.

Kenneth Waltz argued that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons "may be better" for stability, but South Asia's experience is more complicated. INS Arihant gives India a survivable deterrent, yet it also fuels an arms race, nuclearises the Indian Ocean and raises risks of miscalculation. Strategic stability now depends on Pakistan maintaining credible deterrence and on both sides agreeing to maritime risk-reduction measures.

(b) LEMOA: comment

In a radio broadcast on 7 September 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru declared that India would "keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another." The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), signed by India and the United States in August 2016, marked a major departure from that tradition of non-alignment and showed how far the US-India partnership had moved in response to China's rise.

Background.

LEMOA was signed on 29 August 2016 in Washington by Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. It is an India-specific version of the US Logistics Support Agreement, allowing the two militaries to use each other's bases for refuelling, repairs, supplies and rest on a reimbursable, case-by-case basis. It was the first of three "foundational agreements", followed by COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020).

(b) Comments on LEMOA's meaning and implications

1. Interoperability.

LEMOA makes joint operations, exercises and humanitarian missions easier by simplifying logistics between the two militaries. (Reference: US Department of Defense and Indian Ministry of Defence joint statement, 29 August 2016.)

2. Extended reach for India.

Indian ships and aircraft can use US facilities such as Diego Garcia and Djibouti, extending India's operational reach across the Indian Ocean. (Reference: Indian Navy statements; US Department of Defense.)

3. US access to Indian facilities.

US forces can use Indian bases for logistics, strengthening the US presence in the region without permanent bases. (Reference: LEMOA text as described by the Indian Ministry of Defence, 2016.)

4. Checking China's influence.

By improving US-India cooperation at sea, LEMOA supports efforts to counter China's naval presence in the Indian Ocean and its port projects. (Reference: US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, June 2019.)

5. Not an alliance or basing agreement.

India stressed that LEMOA does not allow the stationing of US troops and does not create an alliance, preserving its "strategic autonomy". (Reference: Statement of Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, August 2016; Ministry of External Affairs of India.)

6. A step towards deeper integration.

LEMOA opened the way for COMCASA and BECA, which allow secure communications and sharing of geospatial intelligence, making India a closer US partner. (Reference: US-India 2+2 Joint Statements, 2018 and 2020.)

7. Concerns for Pakistan.

Pakistan views LEMOA as strengthening India's military reach and US-India strategic convergence, adding to the imbalance in South Asia. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements, 2016; ISSI and IPRI analyses.)

8. Domestic criticism in India.

Critics in India argued that LEMOA could draw India into US conflicts and compromise non-alignment, showing the tension between partnership and autonomy. (Reference: Debates in the Indian Parliament and media, August–September 2016.)

Conclusion.

George Washington advised in his Farewell Address (1796) that it was America's "true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances." India has similarly avoided a formal alliance, but LEMOA shows that it is willing to build deep military cooperation with the US to balance China. The agreement strengthens both countries' reach in the Indian Ocean and signals a strategic alignment that Pakistan and China must take into account.