Discuss the strategic contours of Indo-US evolving partnership and how will it impact Pakistan-US and Pakistan-China relations?

Introduction

Addressing the Indian Parliament in November 2010, President Barack Obama called the relationship between the United States and India "one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century." Two Cold War estranged democracies have since built a strategic partnership spanning nuclear energy, defence, technology and the Indo-Pacific, driven above all by a shared concern about China's rise. This evolving partnership reshapes South Asia's strategic balance and directly affects Pakistan's two most important external relationships: with the United States, its long-time but uneven partner, and with China, its "all-weather" friend.

Overview

During the Cold War, India leaned towards the Soviet Union while Pakistan was a US ally. After India's nuclear tests in 1998, US sanctions gave way to engagement, starting with President Clinton's visit in 2000. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004) and the civil nuclear deal (2005–2008) marked a turning point. Successive administrations, from Bush to Obama, Trump and Biden, deepened defence and technology ties. In 2016 the US named India a Major Defense Partner, and India became central to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Frictions over trade and India's ties with Russia, notably the US tariffs of 2025, have tested but not broken the partnership.

Strategic contours of the Indo-US partnership

1. The civil nuclear deal.

The 123 Agreement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver of September 2008 ended India's nuclear isolation without requiring it to sign the NPT, a privilege denied to Pakistan. (Reference: US-India Joint Statement, 18 July 2005; NSG Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India, 6 September 2008.)

2. Major Defense Partner status.

In 2016 the US designated India a Major Defense Partner, and in 2018 granted it Strategic Trade Authorization Tier-1 status, easing access to advanced technology. (Reference: US-India Joint Statement, 7 June 2016; US Department of Commerce, STA-1 notification, August 2018.)

3. The foundational agreements.

India and the US signed LEMOA (2016) for logistics support, COMCASA (2018) for secure communications and BECA (2020) for sharing geospatial intelligence, enabling deep military interoperability. (Reference: US Department of Defense and Indian Ministry of Defence statements, 2016, 2018 and 2020.)

4. The 2+2 ministerial dialogue.

Since September 2018, the foreign and defence ministers of both countries meet in a "2+2" format to coordinate strategy. (Reference: Joint Statement on the inaugural US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, 6 September 2018.)

5. The Quad and Malabar exercises.

The Quad with Japan and Australia was revived in 2017 and raised to leaders' level in 2021, and the Malabar naval exercise includes all four since 2020. (Reference: Quad Leaders' Joint Statement, 12 March 2021; Indian Navy, Malabar 2020.)

6. Technology and the iCET.

The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (2023), deals to co-produce GE F414 jet engines and the purchase of MQ-9B drones give India access to cutting-edge technology. (Reference: US-India Joint Statement, 22 June 2023; Indian Ministry of Defence, MQ-9B contract, October 2024.)

7. Trade and investment.

The US is India's largest trading partner, with two-way trade of goods and services approaching US$200 billion, and US technology firms have invested heavily in India. (Reference: Office of the US Trade Representative, US-India trade data; Indian Ministry of Commerce, 2024.)

8. Frictions over Russia and tariffs.

India's purchases of Russian oil and the S-400 system, and US tariffs of up to 50 per cent on Indian goods imposed in August 2025, show that the partnership has limits and that India guards its strategic autonomy. (Reference: The White House, Executive Order on additional duties on India, 6 August 2025; Ministry of External Affairs of India statements.)

Impact on Pakistan-US relations

1. De-hyphenation.

The US now treats India as a strategic partner and Pakistan as a separate, narrower relationship focused on counter-terrorism, Afghanistan and stability, rather than balancing the two. (Reference: The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy, February 2022; US Department of State, Pakistan country brief.)

2. Strategic imbalance.

US technology transfers and intelligence sharing with India widen the conventional gap between India and Pakistan, increasing Pakistan's reliance on nuclear deterrence. (Reference: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements on the NSG waiver and arms transfers.)

3. Transactional ties.

Pakistan-US relations have become episodic and transactional, warming when Washington needs Pakistan's help, as on Afghanistan, and cooling otherwise. (Reference: Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, 2023.)

4. Periodic re-engagement.

Frictions in US-India ties can open space for Pakistan: in 2025, President Trump hosted Pakistan's army chief at the White House in June and the two countries reached a trade agreement in July, even as US-India trade tensions rose. (Reference: The White House, readout of 18 June 2025; Government of Pakistan statement on the US-Pakistan trade agreement, July 2025.)

Impact on Pakistan-China relations

1. A deeper all-weather partnership.

The US-India partnership pushes Pakistan and China closer, as both see India's alignment with the US as aimed at containing them. (Reference: Joint Statements of Pakistan and China, 2015–2024.)

2. CPEC under scrutiny.

US officials have criticised CPEC's debt terms, and Pakistan must defend CPEC while assuring the US that it is an economic, not a military, project. (Reference: Remarks of US Acting Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells, Wilson Center, 21 November 2019; CPEC Authority responses.)

3. Defence cooperation.

China is now Pakistan's main supplier of major arms, including J-10C fighters and PL-15 missiles, which were used in the May 2025 conflict with India. (Reference: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; ISPR statements, May 2025.)

4. Diplomatic cover.

China supports Pakistan at the UN Security Council, as in the closed consultations on Kashmir in August 2019, and coordinates with it on Afghanistan and regional issues. (Reference: UN Security Council records, 16 August 2019; China-Pakistan-Afghanistan trilateral dialogue statements.)

Way forward for Pakistan

Pakistan should avoid becoming part of any bloc. It should keep its strategic partnership with China while building a broad-based, economic relationship with the US, focused on trade, investment, technology, climate and its diaspora. It must also strengthen its economy and defence self-reliance, use diplomacy to raise concerns about the strategic imbalance and nuclear discrimination, and present itself as a bridge rather than a battleground between the great powers.

Conclusion

Hans Morgenthau wrote in Politics Among Nations (1948): "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." The Indo-US partnership is a product of that struggle, aimed at balancing China, and it has made India the preferred US partner in South Asia. For Pakistan, it has narrowed relations with Washington and deepened dependence on Beijing. Yet the frictions of 2025 show that alignments are not permanent. A balanced foreign policy, backed by a strong economy, can allow Pakistan to keep China close while rebuilding a stable relationship with the United States.