Given the volatile lockdown in Indian Occupied Kashmir, what are the viable policy choices available to Pakistan? What can Pakistan realistically do to ease the sufferings of Kashmiri people?

Introduction

In a radio broadcast on 2 November 1947, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared: "We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people." On 5 August 2019, India reversed the spirit of that pledge by revoking Articles 370 and 35A of its Constitution, splitting Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories and imposing an unprecedented lockdown and communications blackout. Millions of Kashmiris were cut off from the world, and thousands, including mainstream politicians, were detained. For Pakistan, a party to the dispute under UN resolutions, the question was how to respond effectively without war, and how to ease the sufferings of Kashmiris in practical ways.

Overview

The lockdown included curfews, the arrest of political leaders and activists, and a complete shutdown of internet and phone services; high-speed mobile internet was restored only in February 2021, after about eighteen months. The UN Security Council discussed Kashmir in closed consultations on 16 August 2019, the first such meeting on the issue in decades. India later introduced new domicile rules (2020), redrew constituencies in 2022 and held assembly elections in 2024, and its Supreme Court upheld the revocation of Article 370 in December 2023. Pakistan responded by downgrading diplomatic relations, suspending bilateral trade and launching a diplomatic campaign.

Viable policy choices available to Pakistan

1. Diplomacy at the United Nations.

Pakistan can keep Kashmir on the UN agenda through letters to the Security Council, statements in the General Assembly and the support of China, a permanent member. (Reference: UN Security Council closed consultations, 16 August 2019; UN Security Council resolutions 47 (1948) and 122 (1957).)

2. The OIC and the Muslim world.

The OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir, created in 1994, and OIC resolutions provide a platform to mobilise Muslim countries, though Pakistan must work to make their support more active. (Reference: OIC Council of Foreign Ministers resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir; OIC Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission reports.)

3. Engaging the major powers.

Pakistan must convince the US, the EU, China, Russia and the Gulf states that a Kashmir settlement is essential for peace in a nuclear South Asia, as crises such as May 2025 showed. (Reference: statements of the UN Secretary-General and US officials on India-Pakistan crises, 2019 and 2025.)

4. Legal and human rights forums.

Pakistan can raise Kashmir at the UN Human Rights Council, support the work of UN Special Rapporteurs and press for a commission of inquiry recommended by the UN human rights office. (Reference: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir, June 2018, and Update, July 2019.)

5. Information and diaspora campaign.

Using international media, think tanks and the large Kashmiri and Pakistani diaspora in the UK, US and Europe can keep public and parliamentary attention on Kashmir. (Reference: UK Parliament debates on Kashmir, 2019–2021; European Parliament debate on Kashmir, September 2019.)

6. Crisis management and dialogue.

Pakistan should keep channels open with India, as shown by the reaffirmation of the LoC ceasefire in February 2021, while insisting that any dialogue include Kashmir. (Reference: Joint statement of the Directors General of Military Operations of Pakistan and India, 25 February 2021.)

7. Credible deterrence.

A strong defence deters India from further aggression and keeps the cost of unilateral action high, but a military solution to the dispute is not viable between nuclear states. (Reference: ISPR statements; SIPRI Yearbook 2025.)

8. A model of governance in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Good governance, development and democracy in AJK and GB strengthen Pakistan's moral case and contrast with the situation across the LoC. (Reference: AJK Interim Constitution 1974, Thirteenth Amendment 2018; Government of AJK development reports.)

What Pakistan can realistically do to ease Kashmiris' sufferings

1. Documenting abuses.

Pakistan can compile and publish evidence of human rights violations, as in its dossier of September 2021, and share it with UN bodies, governments and media. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, dossier on human rights violations in IIOJK, 12 September 2021.)

2. Mobilising UN mechanisms.

Pakistan can encourage UN Special Rapporteurs and treaty bodies to issue communications on detentions, communications blackouts and demographic changes, which they did in 2019–2021. (Reference: Communications of UN Special Procedures on India, 2019–2021.)

3. Keeping the LoC calm.

Ceasefire violations kill civilians on both sides of the LoC. Maintaining the 2021 ceasefire protects Kashmiri villagers living along the line. (Reference: DGMOs' joint statement, 25 February 2021; AJK government data on civilian casualties.)

4. Education and scholarships.

Pakistan can expand scholarships and reserved seats for Kashmiri students in its universities and medical colleges, giving young Kashmiris opportunities. (Reference: Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, scholarship programmes for students from Jammu and Kashmir.)

5. Humanitarian offers.

Pakistan can repeatedly offer medical aid and humanitarian access through the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross, putting the burden of refusal on India. (Reference: ICRC operations in Jammu and Kashmir; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements, 2019–2020.)

6. Divided families and cross-LoC links.

Pakistan can press for the restoration of the cross-LoC bus service and trade, started in 2005 and 2008 and suspended in 2019, which allowed divided families to meet. (Reference: India-Pakistan agreements on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus (2005) and cross-LoC trade (2008).)

7. Political and moral support.

Pakistan's annual observance of Youm-e-Istehsal (5 August) and Kashmir Solidarity Day (5 February), and its support for Kashmiri political voices, show Kashmiris that they are not alone. (Reference: Government of Pakistan notifications on Kashmir Solidarity Day and Youm-e-Istehsal.)

8. Building economic strength.

A strong economy gives Pakistan diplomatic weight; Kashmir's cause is best served by a stable, prosperous Pakistan that the world takes seriously. (Reference: National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022–2026, on economic security.)

Limits of Pakistan's options

Pakistan's options are constrained by India's economic and diplomatic weight, the reluctance of major powers to pressure India, divisions in the Muslim world, Pakistan's own economic weakness and the risk of escalation between nuclear states. India rejects third-party mediation, and the UN has not acted beyond consultations. Pakistan's realistic aim is therefore to keep the issue alive internationally, protect Kashmiris where it can and prepare for a settlement when circumstances allow.

Conclusion

Allama Iqbal lamented in Armaghan-e-Hijaz: "Aaj woh Kashmir hai mehkoom-o-majboor-o-faqir" (Today that Kashmir is subjugated, helpless and poor). The lockdown of 2019 made his words painfully true again. Pakistan cannot end the occupation alone, but it can pursue sustained diplomacy at the UN and OIC, engage major powers, document abuses, keep the LoC calm and support Kashmiris through education and humanitarian offers. Above all, a strong and stable Pakistan, firm in its principled position based on UN resolutions, offers the best hope that Kashmiris will one day exercise the right that Nehru himself once promised them.