Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly becoming intense. Define the interests and role of US, China, India, Japan and Australia in the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific region.

Introduction

Addressing the Indian Parliament in August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke of the "confluence of the two seas", saying that "the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity." His idea gave birth to the strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific, stretching from the east coast of Africa to the western Pacific. The region holds more than half the world's population, about 60 per cent of global GDP and the busiest sea lanes on earth. China's rise and the US response have made it the main theatre of 21st-century great-power competition, in which India, Japan and Australia play key roles.

Overview

The term "Indo-Pacific" replaced "Asia-Pacific" in US strategy under President Trump, when the US Pacific Command was renamed US Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018. Japan launched its Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision in 2016, and the Quad of the US, Japan, India and Australia was revived in 2017. China rejects the concept as a strategy of containment and pursues its own vision through the Belt and Road Initiative and its growing navy. ASEAN responded with its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (2019), stressing inclusiveness and ASEAN centrality.

United States: interests and role

1. Interest: preserving primacy and a rules-based order.

The US seeks to prevent any single power from dominating Asia and to uphold freedom of navigation and open markets. (Reference: The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022.)

2. Interest: protecting allies and Taiwan.

The US has treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, and commitments to Taiwan's self-defence under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). (Reference: Taiwan Relations Act, 1979; US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 1960.)

3. Role: military presence and new partnerships.

Through Indo-Pacific Command, freedom-of-navigation operations, the Quad and AUKUS (2021), the US leads a network to balance China. (Reference: AUKUS Leaders' Statement, 15 September 2021; US Department of Defense, freedom of navigation reports.)

4. Role: economic engagement.

The US launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in May 2022 with 13 partners, though it does not offer market access like a free trade agreement. (Reference: Office of the US Trade Representative and US Department of Commerce, IPEF launch, 23 May 2022.)

China: interests and role

1. Interest: territorial claims and Taiwan.

China claims most of the South China Sea within its "nine-dash line" and regards Taiwan's reunification as a core interest. The 2016 arbitral award rejected its historic rights claim, which China refuses to accept. (Reference: Permanent Court of Arbitration, South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), award of 12 July 2016.)

2. Interest: securing sea lanes.

Most of China's energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, so China wants secure routes and alternatives such as Gwadar and Myanmar's Kyaukphyu. (Reference: US Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints; CPEC documents.)

3. Role: naval expansion and island building.

China now has the world's largest navy by number of ships and has built military facilities on artificial islands, plus its first overseas base in Djibouti (2017). (Reference: US Department of Defense, China Military Power Report 2024.)

4. Role: economic leadership.

Through the Maritime Silk Road and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), in force from January 2022, China is the main trading partner of most Indo-Pacific states. (Reference: Xi Jinping's speech to the Indonesian Parliament, October 2013; RCEP Agreement, 2020.)

India: interests and role

1. Interest: primacy in the Indian Ocean.

India sees the Indian Ocean as its strategic backyard and is concerned about China's presence in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar and the Maldives. (Reference: Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, 2015.)

2. Interest: balancing China on land and sea.

After the Galwan clash of 2020, India sought closer ties with the US and its partners to balance China. (Reference: Ministry of External Affairs of India statements, June 2020; Quad Leaders' Joint Statements.)

3. Role: Act East and SAGAR.

India's Act East Policy (2014) and SAGAR ("Security and Growth for All in the Region", 2015) project it as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. (Reference: Prime Minister Modi's address in Mauritius, March 2015; Ministry of External Affairs of India, Act East Policy.)

4. Role: a partner with strategic autonomy.

India joins the Quad and Malabar exercises but avoids formal alliances, keeps ties with Russia and stays out of IPEF's trade pillar. (Reference: Ministry of External Affairs of India statements on IPEF, 2022; Indian Navy, Malabar exercises.)

Japan: interests and role

1. Interest: security against China and North Korea.

Japan faces Chinese pressure around the Senkaku Islands and North Korean missiles, making regional security vital. (Reference: Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2024 white paper.)

2. Interest: open sea lanes and trade.

As an island trading nation dependent on imported energy, Japan needs free navigation through the Indian and Pacific Oceans. (Reference: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.)

3. Role: the architect of the Indo-Pacific idea.

Abe's 2007 speech and his FOIP vision (2016) made Japan the intellectual founder of the concept and a key Quad member. (Reference: Prime Minister Abe's address at TICAD VI, Nairobi, August 2016.)

4. Role: rearmament and quality infrastructure.

Japan's National Security Strategy of December 2022 plans to raise defence spending to about 2 per cent of GDP by fiscal 2027, while its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure offers an alternative to the BRI. (Reference: Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, 16 December 2022; Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, 2015.)

Australia: interests and role

1. Interest: security of its region.

Australia wants to keep the South Pacific free of hostile bases, as shown by its concern over the China-Solomon Islands security agreement of 2022. (Reference: Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review, April 2023.)

2. Interest: trade without coercion.

China is Australia's largest trading partner, but after Canberra called for an inquiry into COVID-19's origins in 2020, China imposed trade restrictions on barley, wine and coal. (Reference: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, trade data; WTO disputes DS598 and DS602.)

3. Role: AUKUS and nuclear-powered submarines.

Under AUKUS, Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines, a major step in its defence posture announced in March 2023. (Reference: AUKUS Leaders' Joint Statement on the Optimal Pathway, San Diego, 13 March 2023.)

4. Role: a Quad member and Pacific partner.

Australia contributes to the Quad, Malabar exercises and development aid to Pacific Island states. (Reference: Australian Government, Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017; Pacific Step-up programme.)

Assessment and implications for Pakistan

The Indo-Pacific is becoming a contest between a US-led network of partners and a rising China, but most regional states, including ASEAN members, prefer not to choose sides and value both US security and Chinese trade. For Pakistan, the Indo-Pacific strategy elevates India as a US partner and places CPEC and Gwadar under scrutiny. Pakistan should promote the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean as zones of cooperation, strengthen its maritime security, keep its partnership with China and develop economic ties with all Indo-Pacific states.

Conclusion

Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2020 that Asian countries "do not want to be forced to choose between the two," the United States and China. The interests of the US, China, India, Japan and Australia overlap and clash across the Indo-Pacific, making it the centre of world politics. Whether competition remains peaceful will depend on whether the great powers respect international law, avoid confrontation over Taiwan and the South China Sea, and leave room for the region's states to cooperate with both.