How the United States is trying to keep its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific and what is the China's response to it?

Introduction

In her October 2011 article "America's Pacific Century", US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote: "The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action." The US had been the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific since 1945, with bases, alliances and naval supremacy. China's rapid economic and military rise threatened that position. Since then, Washington has used military, diplomatic and economic tools to preserve its primacy, while China has responded by building its own power, institutions and influence, turning the region into the main stage of US-China rivalry.

Overview

President Obama announced the "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia in his address to the Australian Parliament in November 2011. The US promised to shift military, diplomatic and economic resources to the region after a decade of wars in the Middle East. President Trump replaced it with the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy announced at APEC in Da Nang in November 2017, and his National Security Strategy of December 2017 called China a "revisionist power". China, under Xi Jinping since 2012, became more assertive in the South China Sea, launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and modernised its armed forces.

How the US is trying to keep its dominant position

1. Military rebalance.

The US decided to base about 60 per cent of its naval forces in the Pacific by 2020 and began rotating US Marines through Darwin, Australia, in 2012. (Reference: Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, 2 June 2012; US-Australia Force Posture Initiatives, 2011.)

2. Alliances and partnerships.

The US strengthened alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines and built new partnerships with India, Vietnam and Singapore. (Reference: US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, April 2015; US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, 2014.)

3. Freedom of navigation operations.

From October 2015, US warships sailed within 12 nautical miles of China's artificial islands to challenge its maritime claims. (Reference: US Department of Defense, Freedom of Navigation Program annual reports; USS Lassen operation, 27 October 2015.)

4. Missile defence.

The deployment of the THAAD missile defence system in South Korea in 2017 strengthened US military posture in Northeast Asia, which China saw as a threat. (Reference: US Forces Korea and South Korean Ministry of National Defense statements, 2016–2017.)

5. Trade agreements and economic statecraft.

The US negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), signed in February 2016, to write trade rules without China, though President Trump withdrew from it in January 2017 and later launched a trade war with tariffs in 2018. (Reference: TPP Agreement, 4 February 2016; Presidential Memorandum withdrawing from the TPP, 23 January 2017; USTR Section 301 actions, 2018.)

6. The Quad and the Indo-Pacific framing.

The US revived the Quad with Japan, India and Australia in November 2017 and renamed its Pacific Command the US Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018, extending its strategic map to include India. (Reference: US Department of State, Quad consultations, Manila, 12 November 2017; US Department of Defense, May 2018.)

7. Support for Taiwan.

The US continued arms sales to Taiwan and passed laws such as the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), signalling commitment to Taiwan's defence capacity. (Reference: Taiwan Relations Act, 1979; Taiwan Travel Act, March 2018.)

8. Declaring China a strategic competitor.

The 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy made competition with China the top US priority, and Congress passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act in December 2018. (Reference: The White House, National Security Strategy, December 2017; US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018; Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, 2018.)

China's response

1. Island-building and anti-access capabilities.

China reclaimed more than 3,000 acres of land in the Spratly Islands between 2013 and 2015 and built runways and radars, while developing anti-ship missiles such as the DF-21D to deter US forces. (Reference: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative; US Department of Defense, China Military Power Report 2018.)

2. Rejecting the arbitral award.

China rejected the July 2016 ruling of the arbitral tribunal in Philippines v. China, which found its "nine-dash line" claims had no legal basis. (Reference: Permanent Court of Arbitration, award of 12 July 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China statement, 12 July 2016.)

3. ADIZ and grey-zone tactics.

China declared an Air Defence Identification Zone over the East China Sea in November 2013 and uses coast guard and maritime militia vessels to press claims without open war. (Reference: Ministry of National Defense of China announcement, 23 November 2013; CSIS AMTI reports.)

4. Military modernisation and overseas bases.

Sweeping PLA reforms from 2015 and China's first overseas base in Djibouti (2017) expanded its reach. (Reference: China's Military Strategy white paper, May 2015; US Department of Defense, China Military Power Report 2018.)

5. The Belt and Road and the AIIB.

China launched the BRI in 2013 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2016, which many US allies joined despite US objections, creating alternatives to Western-led finance. (Reference: AIIB Articles of Agreement, 2015; NDRC, BRI Vision and Actions, 2015.)

6. Regional trade.

China promoted the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signed in 2020, which includes US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia but not the US. (Reference: RCEP Agreement, 15 November 2020.)

7. Diplomacy with ASEAN and economic leverage.

China negotiated a framework for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with ASEAN in 2017, while using economic pressure, such as boycotts of South Korean firms after the THAAD deployment, to punish those who opposed it. (Reference: China-ASEAN Framework of the Code of Conduct, August 2017; reports on Chinese measures against Lotte, 2017.)

8. Retaliation in the trade war.

China responded to US tariffs with tariffs of its own and sought to diversify trade and technology away from the US, promoting self-reliance through "Made in China 2025". (Reference: Chinese Ministry of Commerce announcements, 2018–2019; State Council, Made in China 2025, 2015.)

Assessment

The US retains unmatched military power, alliances and financial influence, but it has lost ground economically, especially after leaving the TPP. China has become the leading trading partner of almost every Asian country and has changed facts on the ground in the South China Sea. The result is not a clear victory for either side, but a long competition in which most regional states seek security ties with the US and economic ties with China. For Pakistan, this rivalry shapes its relations with both powers and makes balanced diplomacy essential.

Conclusion

Meeting President Obama at Sunnylands in June 2013, Xi Jinping said: "The vast Pacific Ocean has enough space to accommodate the two large countries of China and the United States." The question for the Asia-Pacific is whether this will prove true. The US is trying to keep its dominance through military presence, alliances and economic strategies, while China responds with its own military build-up, infrastructure diplomacy and trade networks. Peace in the region will depend on whether both powers can manage their rivalry within agreed rules, leaving space for others to prosper.