Explain the salient contours of the US 'rebalancing' policy and China's assertive policy in South China Sea and latter's disputes with the regional countries. Critically evaluate.

Introduction

Addressing the Australian Parliament in November 2011, President Barack Obama declared: "The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay." His rebalancing policy aimed to shift American attention and resources to Asia after a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, China was becoming more assertive in the South China Sea, pressing its sweeping claims against the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The interaction between the US rebalance and China's assertiveness turned the South China Sea into one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints.

Overview

The South China Sea carries about one-third of global maritime trade, holds rich fisheries and possible oil and gas reserves, and lies at the heart of Southeast Asia. Its islands and reefs, including the Paracels, Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal, are claimed in whole or part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, while Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands overlaps China's claim. China's claim is based on a "nine-dash line" covering most of the sea. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which all claimants except Taiwan have ratified, defines maritime zones from land features.

Salient contours of the US rebalancing policy

1. Military posture.

The US planned to base about 60 per cent of its navy in the Pacific by 2020 and rotated Marines through Darwin from 2012. (Reference: Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Shangri-La Dialogue, 2 June 2012.)

2. Strengthening alliances.

The US upgraded defence guidelines with Japan (2015) and signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines (2014). (Reference: US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, 2015; US-Philippines EDCA, 2014.)

3. New partnerships.

The US deepened ties with India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, and lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in May 2016. (Reference: The White House, remarks by President Obama in Hanoi, 23 May 2016.)

4. Multilateral engagement.

The US joined the East Asia Summit in 2011 and hosted the first US-ASEAN summit on US soil at Sunnylands in February 2016. (Reference: Sunnylands Declaration, US-ASEAN Special Leaders' Summit, 16 February 2016.)

5. Trade: the TPP.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership was the economic pillar of the rebalance, signed in February 2016, though the US withdrew in January 2017. (Reference: TPP Agreement, 4 February 2016; Presidential Memorandum, 23 January 2017.)

6. Diplomatic presence and values.

Secretary Clinton and President Obama made frequent visits to Asia and supported Myanmar's political opening, with Obama's visit in November 2012. (Reference: Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", Foreign Policy, October 2011.)

7. Freedom of navigation.

The US conducted freedom of navigation operations near China's artificial islands from October 2015, rejecting claims inconsistent with UNCLOS. (Reference: US Department of Defense, Freedom of Navigation Program reports, 2015–2017.)

8. Continuity after Obama.

Although the "rebalance" label was dropped, its core continued under the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy from 2017. (Reference: The White House, National Security Strategy, December 2017.)

China's assertive policy and its disputes with regional countries

1. The nine-dash line.

In May 2009, China submitted a map with the nine-dash line to the UN, asserting "indisputable sovereignty" over the islands and adjacent waters. (Reference: Notes verbales of the People's Republic of China to the UN Secretary-General, 7 May 2009.)

2. The Philippines: Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

After a 2012 standoff, China took control of Scarborough Shoal; its coast guard has since used water cannon and blocking tactics against Philippine supply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, culminating in a violent clash in June 2024. (Reference: Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines statements, 2012 and 2024; CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.)

3. Vietnam: the Paracels and the oil rig crisis.

China has held the Paracels since 1974; in May 2014 it placed the HYSY-981 oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam, sparking clashes at sea and riots in Vietnam. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam statements, May 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China statements, 2014.)

4. Island-building in the Spratlys.

Between 2013 and 2015, China reclaimed more than 3,000 acres and built airstrips, ports and radar on reefs such as Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief. (Reference: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China Island Tracker; US Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, 2015.)

5. Malaysia and Brunei.

Chinese coast guard ships have operated near Malaysian oil and gas fields such as Luconia Shoals, though Malaysia and Brunei have preferred quiet diplomacy. (Reference: CSIS AMTI reports on Malaysia's offshore operations, 2019–2023.)

6. Indonesia: the Natuna waters.

Chinese fishing fleets and coast guard vessels have entered Indonesia's EEZ near the Natuna Islands, leading Indonesia to rename the area the North Natuna Sea in 2017 and to deploy its navy. (Reference: Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, July 2017; Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements, January 2020.)

7. Administrative and legal steps.

China created Sansha City in 2012 to administer the islands and passed a Coast Guard Law in 2021 allowing the use of weapons against foreign vessels in waters it claims. (Reference: State Council of China, establishment of Sansha, July 2012; Coast Guard Law of the PRC, February 2021.)

8. Rejection of the 2016 award.

In *Philippines v. China, the arbitral tribunal ruled on 12 July 2016* that the nine-dash line had no legal basis for historic rights; China called the award "null and void" and refused to comply. (Reference: Permanent Court of Arbitration, award of 12 July 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China statement, 12 July 2016.)

Critical evaluation

The US rebalance reassured allies and signalled long-term commitment, but it was under-resourced, distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, and weakened when the US left the TPP, its economic centrepiece. It did not stop China's island-building, which created facts on the ground. China's assertiveness secured physical control over key features but alarmed its neighbours, pushing the Philippines, Vietnam and others closer to the US and damaging China's image as a peaceful rising power. ASEAN, divided by members' ties with China, has failed to conclude a binding Code of Conduct after more than two decades of talks. The result is an unstable balance in which neither side can achieve its goals without risking conflict.

Conclusion

Singapore's founding leader Lee Kuan Yew observed, in remarks collected by Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill (2013): "The size of China's displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance." The South China Sea is where that new balance is being tested. The US rebalance sought to preserve the existing order, while China's assertive policy sought to reshape it in its favour. Stability will depend on respect for international law, a binding code of conduct and restraint by both powers, so that the sea remains a route of trade rather than a theatre of war.