Write short notes on any two of the following: (a) Prospects of regional integration in South Asia (b) The UN efforts for nuclear non-proliferation (c) Climate Change and the Big Powers' role

(a) Prospects of regional integration in South Asia

The Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (1985) commits its members to "promote peace, stability, amity and progress in the region." South Asia, home to about a quarter of humanity, remains one of the least integrated regions of the world. Yet its geography, shared history and common challenges give it real prospects for integration if politics allows.

Background. SAARC was founded in Dhaka on 8 December 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement was signed in Islamabad in 2004 and came into force in 2006. However, the last SAARC summit was held in Kathmandu in 2014; the 2016 Islamabad summit was cancelled after India pulled out, and SAARC has been frozen since.

(a) Prospects

1. Huge untapped trade.

Intra-regional trade is only about 5 per cent of South Asia's total trade, compared with about 25 per cent in ASEAN. The World Bank estimated that trade within South Asia could be worth US$67 billion instead of the actual US$23 billion. (Reference: World Bank, A Glass Half Full: The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia, 2018.)

2. Energy cooperation.

Hydropower from Nepal and Bhutan, Central Asian electricity through CASA-1000 and gas through TAPI can meet the region's energy shortages. Nepal already exports electricity to India and, through India, to Bangladesh. (Reference: World Bank, CASA-1000 project; Nepal Electricity Authority annual reports, 2024.)

3. Connectivity and transit.

Roads, railways and ports linking South Asia with Central Asia, China and the Gulf, including CPEC and the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway, can make the region a trade corridor. (Reference: CPEC Authority; trilateral UAP railway framework agreement, Kabul, July 2025.)

4. Sub-regional cooperation.

Where SAARC is blocked, smaller groupings such as the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement of 2015 show that integration can move step by step. (Reference: Asian Development Bank, SASEC programme; BBIN MVA, 2015.)

5. Joint response to climate change.

South Asia is among the regions most exposed to floods, heatwaves and glacier melt. Shared early warning, water management and disaster response can save lives across borders. (Reference: World Bank, South Asia's Hotspots, 2018; ICIMOD, Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment, 2019.)

6. Religious and cultural tourism.

The Kartarpur Corridor, opened in November 2019, showed how faith-based tourism can build goodwill. Buddhist, Sikh, Hindu and Sufi sites across the region offer great potential. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Kartarpur Corridor agreement, 24 October 2019.)

7. Reviving SAARC institutions.

SAARC's existing bodies, such as the SAARC Development Fund, the South Asian University and the SAARC Disaster Management Centre, provide a ready base for cooperation once political will returns. (Reference: SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu, regional centres and specialised bodies.)

8. A demographic and digital dividend.

South Asia has one of the world's youngest populations. Cooperation on digital trade, IT services, education and skills can turn this into a regional growth engine. (Reference: UNDP, Asia-Pacific Human Development Report 2016, on the youth dividend.)

Hurdles.

Integration is held back by India-Pakistan hostility and the Kashmir dispute, India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty in April 2025, the military clash of May 2025, mistrust of India among smaller neighbours, instability in Afghanistan and the use of trade as a political weapon.

Conclusion.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee often remarked that "you can change friends but not neighbours." South Asia's integration is not a choice but a necessity imposed by geography. Its prospects depend on whether India and Pakistan can separate trade, energy and climate cooperation from their political disputes.

(b) The UN efforts for nuclear non-proliferation

In his "Atoms for Peace" speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke of finding "the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." Since then, the United Nations has been the main forum for efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Background.

The very first resolution of the UN General Assembly, resolution 1 (I) of January 1946, dealt with the problem of atomic energy. During the Cold War the number of nuclear-armed states rose, and today nine states possess nuclear weapons. The UN's work rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

(b) UN efforts

1. Creation of the IAEA.

Eisenhower's proposal led to the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957, which reports to the UN and verifies, through safeguards and inspections, that nuclear material is not diverted to weapons. (Reference: IAEA Statute, 1956; IAEA, "History".)

2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Negotiated with UN support and opened for signature in 1968, the NPT entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. With 191 parties, it is the cornerstone of the regime. (Reference: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.)

3. Limits on testing.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) ended atmospheric tests, and the UN General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 1996, though it has not entered into force. (Reference: UNODA; CTBTO Preparatory Commission, Vienna.)

4. Nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The UN has supported regional treaties that ban nuclear weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco, 1967), the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa (Pelindaba) and Central Asia. (Reference: UNODA, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones.)

5. Security Council resolution 1540.

Adopted in 2004, it obliges all states to prevent non-state actors, including terrorists, from acquiring nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. (Reference: UN Security Council resolution 1540, 28 April 2004.)

6. Sanctions on North Korea.

After North Korea's nuclear test in 2006, the Council imposed sanctions under resolution 1718 and tightened them several times, though North Korea continued testing. (Reference: UN Security Council resolution 1718, 14 October 2006, and later resolutions.)

7. The Iran nuclear deal.

The Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in resolution 2231 (2015). After the US withdrew in 2018 and Iran expanded enrichment, the UK, France and Germany triggered the "snapback", and UN sanctions were reimposed in September 2025. (Reference: UN Security Council resolution 2231, 20 July 2015; UN Security Council records, September 2025.)

8. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Adopted at a UN conference in July 2017, it entered into force in January 2021, banning nuclear weapons outright for its parties, although no nuclear-armed state has joined. (Reference: UNODA, TPNW.)

Limits.

The regime is unequal, recognising only five nuclear-weapon states; the NPT Review Conferences of 2015 and 2022 ended without agreement; the CTBT is not in force; and civil nuclear deals for some non-NPT states, such as the 2008 NSG waiver for India, are seen in Pakistan as discriminatory.

Conclusion.

President John F. Kennedy told the UN General Assembly in 1961: "Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind." The UN has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons but not stopped it. A fair, non-discriminatory and universal regime is the only lasting path to a world free of nuclear danger.

(c) Climate change and the big powers' role

At the UN Climate Summit in September 2014, President Barack Obama said: "We are the first generation to feel the effect of climate change and the last generation who can do something about it." The big powers, which produce most of the world's greenhouse gases, hold the key to whether that generation succeeds.

Background.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) set the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities." The Kyoto Protocol (1997) bound only developed countries, and the Paris Agreement (2015) asked all countries to set national targets to keep warming well below 2°C and to pursue 1.5°C. Since then, the annual COP meetings have tested the commitment of the major emitters.

(c) The big powers' role

1. China: the largest emitter and the largest clean-energy builder.

China emits about 30 per cent of global CO2, but it has pledged to peak emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality before 2060, and it installs more solar and wind capacity than the rest of the world combined. (Reference: President Xi Jinping's address to the UN General Assembly, 22 September 2020; IEA, Renewables 2024.)

2. United States: the largest historical emitter, an unreliable partner.

The US is responsible for the largest share of cumulative emissions. It never ratified Kyoto, left the Paris Agreement under President Trump, rejoined in 2021, and began withdrawing again in January 2025. (Reference: Global Carbon Project, cumulative emissions; UN Secretary-General depositary notifications, 2020–2025.)

3. US climate spending under Biden.

The Inflation Reduction Act (August 2022) provided the largest climate investment in US history, mainly through clean-energy tax credits, though parts were rolled back in 2025. (Reference: US Congress, Inflation Reduction Act of 2022; US Department of Energy.)

4. European Union: the policy leader.

Through the European Green Deal, the EU set a legally binding target of climate neutrality by 2050 and a 55 per cent cut by 2030, and introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. (Reference: European Climate Law, Regulation (EU) 2021/1119; CBAM Regulation (EU) 2023/956.)

5. India: growth versus emissions.

India, now the third-largest emitter, announced a net-zero target for 2070 at COP26 in Glasgow and a goal of 500 GW of non-fossil power capacity by 2030, while insisting on its right to development. (Reference: Prime Minister Modi's statement at COP26, 1 November 2021; India's updated NDC, 2022.)

6. Russia: fossil-fuel dependence.

As a major oil and gas exporter, Russia has weak targets, aiming for carbon neutrality by 2060, and the Ukraine war has pushed climate cooperation further down its agenda. (Reference: Government of the Russian Federation, Low-Carbon Development Strategy to 2050, 2021.)

7. Climate finance promises.

Developed countries pledged US$100 billion a year by 2020, a goal met only in 2022. At COP29 in Baku (2024) they agreed a new goal of at least US$300 billion a year by 2035, far below what developing countries demanded. (Reference: OECD, Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised, 2024; COP29 decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal.)

8. Loss and damage.

Under pressure from vulnerable countries, including Pakistan after its 2022 floods, which caused more than US$30 billion in damage and losses, COP27 agreed to set up a Loss and Damage Fund, operationalised at COP28 in 2023. Contributions so far are small. (Reference: Government of Pakistan, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, 2022; UNFCCC decisions at COP27 and COP28.)

Conclusion.

The big powers' record is mixed: China and the EU are leading the clean-energy transition, while US policy swings with each election and finance for poor countries remains small. As Obama warned, this generation is the last that can act. Countries such as Pakistan, which emits less than one per cent of global greenhouse gases yet suffers heavily, must keep pressing the big powers to match their words with emission cuts and money.