In view of the evolving global alignments and changing nature of major-power relationships, what is the future of globalism and multilateralism? Discuss with examples.

Introduction

Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, said in 1954 that the United Nations "was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell." For seven decades, multilateral institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank and WTO, and the wider globalisation they supported, helped avoid great-power war and lift billions out of poverty. Today this order is under strain from great-power rivalry, protectionism, nationalism and new alignments. Yet globalism and multilateralism are not dying; they are changing shape, becoming more fragmented, regional and issue-based.

Overview

The post-1945 order was built on the UN Charter (1945), the Bretton Woods institutions (1944) and the GATT (1947), which became the WTO in 1995. After the Cold War, globalisation accelerated: China joined the WTO in 2001, trade grew faster than output, and global problems were addressed through treaties such as the Paris Agreement (2015). Since the 2008 financial crisis, however, trade growth has slowed ("slowbalisation"), the US-China rivalry has intensified, the Ukraine war (2022) has divided the world, and the US itself has turned away from several institutions it created.

Pressures on globalism and multilateralism (with examples)

1. Great-power rivalry.

The US-China contest over trade, technology and Taiwan, and the West-Russia confrontation over Ukraine, make cooperation in global bodies harder. (Reference: The White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022; Joint Statement of Russia and China, 4 February 2022.)

2. US retreat from institutions.

The US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, the WHO, UNESCO and the UN Human Rights Council under President Trump, rejoined some under Biden, and left several again in 2025. (Reference: US Executive Orders of 20 January 2025 on the Paris Agreement and the WHO; UN depositary notifications.)

3. Paralysis of the WTO.

The WTO's Appellate Body has been unable to function since December 2019 because the US blocked appointments of its members, weakening the rules-based trading system. (Reference: WTO, Appellate Body status; Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), 2020.)

4. Security Council deadlock.

Vetoes by the US, Russia and China have blocked action on Syria, Ukraine and Gaza, damaging the UN's credibility. (Reference: UN Security Council voting records, 2011–2025; UN General Assembly resolution 76/262 (2022) on the "veto initiative".)

5. The rise of protectionism.

Tariff wars since 2018, and the sweeping US tariffs announced in April 2025, have raised trade barriers to levels not seen for decades. (Reference: WTO, Trade Monitoring Reports; The White House, Executive Order on reciprocal tariffs, 2 April 2025.)

6. Nationalism and populism.

Brexit (2016), "America First" and nationalist governments elsewhere have questioned international commitments in the name of sovereignty. (Reference: UK European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash, 2019.)

7. Weaponised interdependence.

States now use trade, finance and technology as weapons, as in the freezing of Russia's reserves in 2022, US chip export controls and China's controls on rare earths. (Reference: Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence", International Security, 2019; Chinese Ministry of Commerce export control announcements, 2023–2025.)

8. A legitimacy deficit.

The Global South feels under-represented in the Security Council, IMF and World Bank, and was let down by vaccine inequality and slow climate finance. (Reference: UN Secretary-General, Our Common Agenda, 2021; IMF quota and governance reviews.)

The likely future (with examples)

1. Fragmented but persistent globalisation.

Despite rivalry, world trade reached a record of about US$33 trillion in 2024, but supply chains are being reorganised along political lines ("friend-shoring"). (Reference: UNCTAD, Global Trade Update, March 2025; IMF, Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism, 2023.)

2. Minilateral clubs.

Small groups of like-minded states, such as the Quad, AUKUS, the G7 and the Minerals Security Partnership, increasingly replace universal bodies for specific goals. (Reference: Quad and AUKUS leaders' statements; US Department of State, Minerals Security Partnership, 2022.)

3. Regional blocs.

Regional trade agreements are growing: the RCEP in Asia (in force since 2022), the African Continental Free Trade Area (trading since 2021) and the CPTPP. (Reference: RCEP Agreement, 2020; AfCFTA Secretariat; CPTPP texts.)

4. New non-Western institutions.

China and others have built alternative bodies, such as the AIIB, the New Development Bank, an expanded BRICS and the SCO, creating a more pluralistic system. (Reference: AIIB Articles of Agreement, 2015; BRICS Kazan Declaration, 2024.)

5. Issue-based cooperation.

Even rivals cooperate where interests meet: the OECD global minimum tax agreed by over 130 countries in 2021, the High Seas Treaty of 2023 and the WHO Pandemic Agreement of 2025. (Reference: OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework statement, 8 October 2021; Agreement on Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, June 2023; World Health Assembly, 20 May 2025.)

6. Reform of global institutions.

The UN's Pact for the Future (September 2024) committed members to reform the Security Council and international financial institutions, and the African Union joined the G20 in 2023. (Reference: UN General Assembly, Pact for the Future, 22 September 2024; G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration, 2023.)

7. A bigger role for middle powers.

Countries such as India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Indonesia act as swing states, mediating and building coalitions across blocs. (Reference: Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, ECFR, Living in an à la carte world, 2023.)

8. Digital and climate governance.

New areas, artificial intelligence, cyberspace, data and climate, are creating new multilateral processes, such as the Global Digital Compact (2024) and the annual COP negotiations. (Reference: UN, Global Digital Compact, annexed to the Pact for the Future, 2024; UNFCCC COP decisions.)

Conclusion

Martin Luther King Jr. warned in 1964: "We must learn to live together as brothers or perish together as fools." Climate change, pandemics, nuclear risk and financial crises cannot be solved by any nation alone, which ensures that globalism and multilateralism will survive. But the future will not look like the Western-led order of the 1990s. It will be a fragmented, multipolar system of overlapping institutions, regional blocs and issue-based coalitions. For countries like Pakistan, the task is to stay engaged in all of them, defend a rules-based order that protects smaller states and support reforms that give the Global South a fairer voice.