Critically examine China's strategic vision behind 'One Belt, One Road' venture.

Introduction

For decades, China followed Deng Xiaoping's advice to "hide your strength and bide your time" (taoguang yanghui). The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) venture, announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 and later renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), marked a clear departure from that low profile. Through land and sea corridors stretching from China to Europe, Africa and the Indian Ocean, China set out to finance and build infrastructure across the developing world. A critical examination shows that the vision combines genuine development benefits with strategic ambitions, and that its execution has created both opportunities and serious problems for partner countries.

Overview

China's strategic vision behind OBOR has several strands: exporting its surplus industrial capacity, developing its western regions, securing energy and trade routes away from the Strait of Malacca, expanding markets, internationalising the yuan and building political influence in the Global South. The Vision and Actions document of March 2015 described five goals: policy coordination, connectivity, trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. At the first Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May 2017, attended by 29 heads of state and government, China presented OBOR as a shared global public good.

Strengths of the vision

1. Filling the infrastructure gap.

The Asian Development Bank estimated that developing Asia needs about US$26 trillion in infrastructure investment from 2016 to 2030; OBOR offers finance where Western lenders had stepped back. (Reference: Asian Development Bank, Meeting Asia's Infrastructure Needs, 2017.)

2. Trade and connectivity gains.

The World Bank estimated that BRI transport projects could cut travel times along economic corridors by up to 12 per cent and raise trade among participating economies. (Reference: World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors, 2019.)

3. Poverty reduction potential.

The same study estimated that BRI transport projects could lift up to 7.6 million people out of extreme poverty and 32 million out of moderate poverty if accompanied by policy reforms. (Reference: World Bank, Belt and Road Economics, 2019.)

4. Energy security for China and partners.

Pipelines from Central Asia and Myanmar and ports such as Gwadar diversify China's energy routes, while BRI power plants have eased shortages in countries like Pakistan. (Reference: International Energy Agency, China's Engagement in Overseas Energy; CPEC Authority energy projects.)

5. A South-South development model.

OBOR presents China as a developing country helping others, without political conditions, which appeals to many governments in Asia and Africa. (Reference: State Council Information Office of China, white paper on the BRI, October 2023.)

6. Diplomatic dividends.

Participation by more than 150 countries has expanded China's diplomatic support in international forums and on issues such as Taiwan and Xinjiang. (Reference: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs data; UN voting analyses.)

7. Industrial upgrading at home.

By moving construction and some manufacturing abroad, OBOR helps China absorb excess capacity and upgrade its own economy. (Reference: NDRC, Vision and Actions, 2015; Made in China 2025.)

8. Flagship success in CPEC's energy phase.

CPEC's early energy projects helped end Pakistan's load-shedding, showing how OBOR can deliver tangible results quickly. (Reference: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2018; CPEC Authority.)

Weaknesses and criticisms of the vision

1. Debt sustainability.

A 2018 study found eight BRI countries, including Pakistan, Djibouti, the Maldives and Laos, at high risk of debt distress because of BRI-related lending. (Reference: John Hurley, Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance, Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, Center for Global Development, March 2018.)

2. Lack of transparency.

Many loans are opaque, with collateral and confidentiality clauses; researchers estimated about US$385 billion of "hidden debt" owed to China by developing countries. (Reference: AidData, Banking on the Belt and Road, September 2021.)

3. Environmental costs.

Early BRI projects included many coal power plants; China only pledged in September 2021 to stop building new coal plants abroad. (Reference: Xi Jinping's address to the UN General Assembly, 21 September 2021.)

4. Limited local benefits.

Some projects relied heavily on Chinese firms and workers, limiting local jobs and technology transfer and causing resentment. (Reference: Johns Hopkins SAIS China Africa Research Initiative studies; local protests reported in Kenya and Gwadar.)

5. Dual-use and strategic fears.

Ports such as Hambantota, leased to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017, and the base in Djibouti raised fears that commercial ports could serve military purposes. (Reference: Government of Sri Lanka, Hambantota port concession agreement, 2017; US Department of Defense, China Military Power Report.)

6. Corruption and political backlash.

Projects became election issues in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives; Malaysia renegotiated the East Coast Rail Link in 2019, cutting its cost by about a third. (Reference: Prime Minister's Office of Malaysia, ECRL renegotiation, April 2019.)

7. Geopolitical counter-reaction.

India boycotted the 2017 Belt and Road Forum over CPEC, and the US, EU and Japan launched rival infrastructure initiatives. (Reference: Ministry of External Affairs of India statement, 13 May 2017; G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, 2022.)

8. Financial overstretch.

Chinese overseas lending peaked around 2016 and fell sharply afterwards, as debt problems, the pandemic and China's slowing economy forced a shift to "small and beautiful" projects. (Reference: Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Chinese Loans to Africa Database; Xi Jinping's speech at the Third Belt and Road Forum, October 2023.)

Critical assessment

OBOR is neither a purely benevolent development programme nor simply a "debt trap". It is a strategic venture that serves China's economic and geopolitical interests while offering partners finance and infrastructure they need. Its success depends heavily on the governance of partner countries: where they negotiate carefully, as Malaysia did, they gain; where projects are opaque and poorly planned, debts and disputes follow. For Pakistan, CPEC illustrates both sides: energy and roads delivered quickly, but with financial burdens and security challenges.

Conclusion

A saying attributed to Confucius holds that "the man who moves a mountain begins by carrying away small stones." China's strategic vision behind OBOR is to move the mountain of the global economic order towards Asia, one corridor and port at a time. The venture has built real infrastructure and deepened China's global influence, but it has also raised concerns about debt, transparency and strategic intent. Its long-term success will depend on whether China and its partners make it sustainable, transparent and beneficial for ordinary people.