Critically evaluate the US-Pakistan relations under the Joe Biden Administration vis-à-vis the US' Indo-Pacific strategy.

Introduction

Speaking at George Washington University in May 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described China as "the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it." That sentence sums up the lens through which the Joe Biden Administration (2021–2025) viewed the world. Its Indo-Pacific Strategy placed competition with China at the centre of US policy and chose India as its main partner in South Asia. Pakistan, China's closest partner and India's rival, found itself outside this framework. As a result, US-Pakistan relations under Biden were cordial in places but narrow, transactional and largely seen through the prisms of Afghanistan, China and India.

Overview

Pakistan was a US ally in the Cold War through SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955), a frontline state in the Afghan jihad of the 1980s and a major non-NATO ally after 9/11. Each phase of closeness was followed by sanctions or neglect, such as the Pressler Amendment sanctions of 1990. By the time Biden took office in January 2021, the US was leaving Afghanistan, and it completed the withdrawal in August 2021. In February 2022 the White House released its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which called India "a like-minded partner and leader in South Asia" and did not mention Pakistan at all. The Biden years therefore marked a shift: Washington no longer needed Pakistan for a war in Afghanistan, and its strategic attention moved to the competition with China, in which India was the preferred partner.

Strains in US-Pakistan relations under Biden

1. Relations seen only through Afghanistan.

Early Biden-era contacts focused on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, evacuations and counter-terrorism. When Prime Minister Imran Khan said "absolutely not" to hosting US bases for over-the-horizon operations, the gap in expectations became public. (Reference: Imran Khan's interview with Axios on HBO, June 2021.)

2. The missing phone call.

President Biden did not call Prime Minister Imran Khan during his time in office, which Pakistani leaders publicly complained about and which symbolised Pakistan's low place in US priorities. (Reference: statements of National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf, reported by the Financial Times and Dawn, August 2021.)

3. Pakistan left out of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The February 2022 strategy named India as a leading partner and was built around allies and partners such as Japan, Australia and India. Pakistan's absence showed that Washington did not see it as part of its main regional design. (Reference: The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022.)

4. India as the chosen strategic partner.

The US deepened ties with India through the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), launched in January 2023, Prime Minister Modi's state visit in June 2023 and a deal for GE to co-produce F414 jet engines in India. These steps alter the military balance in South Asia to Pakistan's disadvantage. (Reference: The White House, US-India Joint Statement, 22 June 2023.)

5. The Quad and AUKUS.

The first Quad leaders' summit was held in March 2021 and the AUKUS pact was announced in September 2021. Both are designed to balance China, and both strengthen the network around India rather than any role for Pakistan. (Reference: The White House, Quad Leaders' Joint Statement, 12 March 2021; AUKUS Leaders' Statement, 15 September 2021.)

6. China and CPEC.

Washington views Pakistan's closeness to China, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Pakistan's purchase of Chinese weapons, as tilting it into China's camp. Pakistan's refusal to attend Biden's Summit for Democracy in December 2021, which excluded China, reinforced this view. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, statement declining the invitation, 8 December 2021.)

7. Ukraine and the Moscow visit.

Imran Khan was in Moscow on 24 February 2022, the day Russia invaded Ukraine, and Pakistan abstained on UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia. Khan's later claim that a US "cipher" led to his ouster in April 2022 further soured ties, though the US denied it. (Reference: UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1, 2 March 2022; US State Department press briefings, April 2022.)

8. Sanctions on the missile programme.

In December 2024 the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan's National Development Complex and three companies over the long-range missile programme, and a senior White House official said Pakistan was developing missiles that could reach beyond South Asia, a charge Pakistan called "baseless". (Reference: US State Department, sanctions announcement, 18 December 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, response, December 2024.)

Areas of cooperation that kept the relationship alive

1. Flood relief in 2022.

After the devastating floods of 2022, the US provided more than US$200 million in humanitarian aid and sent relief flights, showing that the relationship still had a humanitarian base. (Reference: USAID, Pakistan Floods fact sheets, 2022–2023.)

2. F-16 sustainment package.

In September 2022 the US approved a possible sale of about US$450 million in sustainment support for Pakistan's F-16 fleet, describing it as support for counter-terrorism capacity, despite India's objections. (Reference: US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, notification to Congress, 7 September 2022.)

3. Support at the IMF.

As the largest shareholder of the IMF, the US backed Pakistan's US$3 billion Stand-By Arrangement in July 2023 and the US$7 billion Extended Fund Facility in September 2024, which helped Pakistan avoid default. (Reference: IMF press releases, 12 July 2023 and 25 September 2024.)

4. The US-Pakistan Green Alliance.

The two countries launched a Green Alliance framework in 2022 to cooperate on climate-smart agriculture, clean energy and water management, opening a new non-security area of cooperation. (Reference: US Department of State and US Embassy Islamabad, US-Pakistan Green Alliance framework statements, 2022–2023.)

5. Trade and investment.

The United States remained Pakistan's largest single-country export market, mainly for textiles, and the two sides held meetings under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). (Reference: State Bank of Pakistan, exports by country; Office of the US Trade Representative, US-Pakistan TIFA.)

6. Counter-terrorism cooperation.

With the rise of TTP and ISIS-Khorasan attacks after 2021, both sides kept counter-terrorism cooperation alive, including a counter-terrorism dialogue in 2023. (Reference: US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2022 and 2023, Pakistan chapter.)

7. Seventy-five years of diplomatic relations.

In 2022 both governments marked 75 years of relations; Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari met Secretary Blinken in Washington in September 2022, and President Biden wrote to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in March 2024 stressing cooperation. (Reference: US Department of State, readouts of Blinken-Bilawal meetings, 2022; Prime Minister's Office of Pakistan, March 2024.)

8. People-to-people links.

About half a million Pakistani Americans and programmes such as Fulbright, one of the largest in the world in Pakistan, keep social and educational ties strong regardless of strategic differences. (Reference: US Embassy Islamabad and USEFP, Fulbright Pakistan programme; US Census Bureau, American Community Survey.)

Critical evaluation: the Indo-Pacific factor

The Indo-Pacific Strategy is the key to understanding the Biden years. It treated India as a counterweight to China and therefore accepted India's military rise, including technology transfers that Pakistan sees as a threat. At the same time, Washington did not want to push Pakistan fully into China's arms, which explains the F-16 package, IMF support and flood aid. The result was a "de-hyphenated" policy: India was a strategic partner, Pakistan a country managed for specific issues such as terrorism, nuclear security and economic stability. For Pakistan, the danger was being labelled part of a Chinese bloc; the opportunity was that the US still valued its stability, geography and counter-terrorism cooperation.

Way forward for Pakistan

Pakistan should avoid joining any bloc and keep balanced ties with both Washington and Beijing, presenting CPEC as an economic project open to all investors. It should build a broad-based relationship with the US on trade, technology, climate, education and investment, not only security. It must strengthen its economy so that it negotiates from strength, use its diaspora in the US more actively, and keep raising concerns about the strategic imbalance in South Asia through diplomacy rather than confrontation.

Conclusion

Lord Palmerston told the House of Commons in 1848: "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." The Biden era showed that US policy follows its interests, which now lie in competing with China and partnering with India. Pakistan's relations with the US were neither broken nor close; they were limited and transactional. If Pakistan secures its economy, avoids bloc politics and offers the US real economic and regional value, it can build a steadier relationship that does not rise and fall with every war in its neighbourhood.