Critically examine the Donald Trump's Policy for South Asia and its implications for Pakistan and the region.

Introduction

Announcing his new strategy at Fort Myer on 21 August 2017, President Donald Trump said: "We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting." His South Asia Policy promised to win the war in Afghanistan by sending more troops, pressing Pakistan and giving India a bigger role. Within a year it had cut aid to Pakistan and strained relations, but by late 2018 it had turned towards negotiations with the Taliban, in which Pakistan's help was essential. The policy's contradictions reveal much about US goals in the region and their implications for Pakistan.

Overview

When Trump took office in 2017, the Afghan war was in its sixteenth year and the Taliban were gaining ground. After a long review, Trump announced a policy for Afghanistan and South Asia that abandoned withdrawal timelines, increased US troops from about 8,400 to around 14,000, and gave commanders more authority to strike. He blamed Pakistan for providing "safe havens" and invited India to contribute more to Afghanistan's economic development. On 1 January 2018, Trump tweeted that the US had given Pakistan "more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years" and received "nothing but lies & deceit". Days later, most security assistance to Pakistan was suspended.

Main features of Trump's South Asia policy

1. A conditions-based approach.

Trump replaced timelines with conditions on the ground, saying that "conditions on the ground, not arbitrary timetables, will guide our strategy." (Reference: Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, Fort Myer, Arlington, 21 August 2017.)

2. More troops and wider authority.

The US sent several thousand more troops and relaxed rules of engagement, increasing air strikes against the Taliban and ISIS-K. (Reference: US Department of Defense statements, 2017–2018; US Air Forces Central Command, airpower statistics, 2018.)

3. Pressure on Pakistan.

The policy demanded that Pakistan "do more" against the Haqqani network and the Taliban, threatening aid cuts and other measures. (Reference: Remarks by President Trump, 21 August 2017; US Department of State, suspension of security assistance, 4 January 2018.)

4. A bigger role for India.

Trump called India a key partner and asked it to help more with Afghanistan's economic development, alarming Pakistan. (Reference: Remarks by President Trump, 21 August 2017; US-India Joint Statement, June 2017.)

5. Integration of all instruments.

The strategy aimed to combine military, diplomatic and economic power to force the Taliban to negotiate. (Reference: US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2017.)

6. No nation-building.

Trump said the US would no longer focus on "nation-building", but on "killing terrorists". (Reference: Remarks by President Trump, 21 August 2017.)

7. Regional diplomacy.

The policy sought cooperation from regional states, though it left out Iran and was criticised by China and Russia. (Reference: US Department of State, South and Central Asia strategy documents, 2017–2019.)

8. A shift to negotiations (2018).

In September 2018, the US appointed Zalmay Khalilzad to negotiate directly with the Taliban, and in December 2018 Trump wrote to Prime Minister Imran Khan asking for Pakistan's help, a major reversal. (Reference: US Department of State, appointment of the Special Representative, 21 September 2018; Prime Minister's Office of Pakistan, December 2018.)

Critical examination

The policy rested on a flawed assumption: that more military pressure and coercion of Pakistan could deliver victory in Afghanistan after sixteen years of failure. It ignored Pakistan's own sacrifices in the war on terror and its security concerns about India's role in Afghanistan. Its "conditions-based" promise contradicted Trump's own desire to leave. By 2018, as the Taliban grew stronger, Washington had to turn to the negotiations and to Pakistan's facilitation it had dismissed a year earlier, ending in the Doha Agreement of 2020 and the withdrawal of 2021.

Implications for Pakistan

1. Aid cuts.

The US suspended most security assistance in January 2018 and cancelled US$300 million in Coalition Support Fund reimbursements in September 2018, and later suspended Pakistan's participation in US military training programmes. (Reference: US Department of Defense statement, 1 September 2018; Reuters reports on the IMET suspension, August 2018.)

2. Diplomatic pressure and FATF.

The US, with the UK, France and Germany, moved to put Pakistan on the FATF grey list in 2018, adding economic pressure. (Reference: FATF, Outcomes of the June 2018 Plenary.)

3. A strategic tilt towards China.

The pressure pushed Pakistan closer to China, which publicly defended Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts after Trump's speech. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China press briefing, 22 August 2017; Pakistan National Security Committee statement, 24 August 2017.)

4. Re-engagement through the peace process.

Pakistan's help in bringing the Taliban to talks restored some goodwill, leading to Imran Khan's White House visit in July 2019, though the relationship remained transactional. (Reference: The White House, remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Khan, 22 July 2019.)

Implications for the region

1. Afghanistan's war.

More US firepower did not break the stalemate; civilian casualties remained high and the Taliban expanded their control of rural areas. (Reference: UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict reports, 2017–2019; SIGAR quarterly reports.)

2. India's role.

India's profile in Afghanistan rose, through projects such as the Salma Dam and the Afghan Parliament building, increasing India-Pakistan competition there. (Reference: Ministry of External Affairs of India, India-Afghanistan development partnership.)

3. China and Russia's response.

China and Russia criticised US pressure on Pakistan and deepened their own contacts with the Taliban through formats such as the Moscow talks of November 2018. (Reference: Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan, 9 November 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China statements.)

4. The road to Doha.

The policy's failure to deliver victory led to the US-Taliban Doha Agreement of February 2020 and the withdrawal in 2021, reshaping the region's security. (Reference: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 29 February 2020.)

Conclusion

In December 2018, Prime Minister Imran Khan told The Washington Post that Pakistan did not want a relationship with the US in which it was treated "like a hired gun." Trump's South Asia Policy began by threatening and blaming Pakistan, and ended by seeking its help to leave Afghanistan. Its contradictions damaged trust, strengthened Pakistan's ties with China and gave India a larger regional role, but they also showed that peace in Afghanistan was impossible without Pakistan. The lesson for both countries is that a stable relationship must rest on mutual respect and shared interests, not on pressure and aid.