Some scholars term Afghan Peace Deal as the US Withdrawal Deal. Do you agree? Answer the question while discussing the contours of the Afghan peace process.

Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz wrote in On War that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means." By 2018, America's longest war in Afghanistan had become a policy without a clear purpose, and Washington sought to end it through negotiations with the Taliban. The Doha Agreement of 29 February 2020 was officially titled the "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan." Yet within eighteen months of its signing, US forces had left, the Afghan republic had collapsed and the Taliban ruled Kabul without any political settlement. This outcome explains why many scholars call it a US withdrawal deal rather than a peace deal. A study of the peace process largely supports that view.

Overview

After the US-led invasion of October 2001, the Taliban were excluded from the Bonn Conference and regrouped as an insurgency. By 2010, US troop numbers peaked at about 100,000, but the war remained a stalemate. The Taliban opened a political office in Doha in 2013. After years of failed contacts, President Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 2018, and direct US-Taliban talks began in Doha. More than a year of negotiations produced the Doha Agreement in February 2020, followed by intra-Afghan talks in September 2020. In April 2021, President Biden announced the full withdrawal, and the Taliban captured Kabul on 15 August 2021.

Contours of the Afghan peace process

1. Early contacts and the Murree talks.

Pakistan hosted the first official talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban at Murree in July 2015, but they collapsed when the death of Mullah Omar was revealed. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, statement on the Murree talks, 7 July 2015.)

2. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and China formed the QCG in January 2016 to produce a roadmap for talks, but the Taliban refused to join, and the process ended after Mullah Akhtar Mansour was killed by a US drone in May 2016. (Reference: QCG joint press releases, January–February 2016.)

3. Khalilzad's mission and direct US-Taliban talks.

From late 2018, the US abandoned its insistence on an "Afghan-led" process and negotiated directly with the Taliban in Doha, a major Taliban demand. (Reference: US Department of State, appointment of the Special Representative, 21 September 2018.)

4. The four parts of the Doha Agreement.

The agreement provided for (i) Taliban guarantees against the use of Afghan soil against the US and its allies, (ii) the withdrawal of all foreign forces within 14 months, (iii) intra-Afghan negotiations and (iv) a permanent ceasefire to be discussed in those negotiations. (Reference: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, Doha, 29 February 2020.)

5. The US-Afghan joint declaration.

On the same day, the US and the Afghan government issued a joint declaration in Kabul, but the Afghan government was not a party to the Doha Agreement itself. (Reference: Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States, 29 February 2020.)

6. The prisoner exchange.

The agreement committed to the release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners and 1,000 Afghan security personnel, which the Afghan government reluctantly completed by August 2020 after a Loya Jirga approved it. (Reference: Doha Agreement, Part One; Consultative Loya Jirga resolution, 9 August 2020.)

7. Intra-Afghan negotiations.

Talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban opened in Doha on 12 September 2020 but made little progress beyond procedural rules, as violence continued. (Reference: Statements at the opening ceremony of intra-Afghan negotiations, Doha, 12 September 2020; UNAMA reports.)

8. Regional and Pakistani facilitation.

Pakistan helped bring the Taliban to the table and release Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in 2018, while Russia, China and Qatar hosted parallel meetings, reflecting a regional consensus for a US exit. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements; Moscow Format consultations, 2018–2021; UN Security Council resolution 2513 (2020) endorsing the agreement.)

Why the deal can be called a "US withdrawal deal"

1. Exclusion of the Afghan government.

The elected government in Kabul was not a party to the agreement that decided its future, which undermined its legitimacy and strengthened the Taliban. (Reference: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 2020; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed, February 2023.)

2. A fixed timeline versus vague commitments.

The US committed to a clear 14-month withdrawal, while Taliban obligations on terrorism were general and poorly verifiable. (Reference: Doha Agreement, Parts One and Two; US Congressional Research Service, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, 2021.)

3. No ceasefire.

A ceasefire was left to future intra-Afghan talks; violence against Afghan forces and civilians continued, and targeted killings rose in 2020–21. (Reference: UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict annual report 2020.)

4. No protection for rights.

The agreement contained no guarantees for women's rights, the constitution or elections, issues later decided by the Taliban alone. (Reference: Human Rights Watch commentary on the Doha Agreement, 2020.)

5. Prisoner release imposed on Kabul.

The US committed to the release of Taliban prisoners held by the Afghan government, forcing Kabul to free fighters, many of whom returned to battle. (Reference: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, 2020–2021.)

6. US domestic politics.

Both Presidents Trump and Biden wanted to end the "forever war"; Biden's announcement of 14 April 2021 set the withdrawal regardless of conditions on the ground. (Reference: Remarks by President Biden on the way forward in Afghanistan, 14 April 2021.)

7. Weak enforcement.

The UN Monitoring Team reported that the Taliban maintained ties with al-Qaeda, yet the withdrawal proceeded, showing that the conditions were not decisive. (Reference: UN Security Council Monitoring Team, twelfth report, S/2021/486, June 2021.)

8. The outcome of August 2021.

The Afghan army collapsed and the government fell before any political settlement. SIGAR concluded that the single most important factor in the collapse was the US decision to withdraw. (Reference: SIGAR, Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed, February 2023.)

The counter-view

Defenders of the agreement argue that it achieved its main US aims: no attacks on US forces after February 2020, an exit from an unwinnable war and Taliban promises on terrorism. They blame the Afghan government's corruption, divisions and refusal to compromise for the failure of intra-Afghan talks, rather than the agreement itself. Pakistan and regional states also welcomed the deal as the best available path to end four decades of war.

My position

I largely agree that the Afghan Peace Deal was a US withdrawal deal. It secured an orderly exit for the US and guarantees concerning US security, but it did not create peace among Afghans, protect the political order or secure the rights of Afghan citizens. Its sequence, withdrawal first and political settlement later, gave the Taliban little incentive to compromise, and the events of August 2021 confirmed this. For Pakistan, the lesson is that the absence of a political settlement left an Afghanistan in which groups such as the TTP found space to operate.

Conclusion

Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969, reflecting on Vietnam: "The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win." The Doha Agreement was the American acceptance of this truth in Afghanistan. It ended America's longest war but not Afghanistan's conflict or suffering. A real peace process would have required an inclusive political settlement before withdrawal, with regional guarantees. In its absence, the "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan" will be remembered mainly as the agreement that brought the US out of Afghanistan.