The 2021 Taliban Takeover of Afghanistan presents regional and global challenges. Elaborate the anticipated policies of the Taliban government and the regional and global response.

Introduction

A saying often attributed to Taliban fighters during the long war was: "You have the watches, but we have the time." On 15 August 2021, time proved them right. As US and NATO forces completed their withdrawal, the Afghan republic collapsed and the Taliban entered Kabul almost without a fight. Their return after twenty years raised urgent questions: would they govern differently from their first rule of 1996–2001, would Afghanistan again become a haven for terrorists, and how would the region and the world deal with them? The answers have shaped the security of Pakistan, Central Asia and beyond.

Overview

The US-Taliban Doha Agreement of 29 February 2020 set a timeline for the withdrawal of foreign forces in return for Taliban guarantees that Afghan soil would not be used against the US and its allies. Intra-Afghan talks failed, and as foreign troops left, the Taliban captured provincial capitals in quick succession. President Ashraf Ghani fled on 15 August 2021, and the last US troops left on 30 August. On 7 September 2021 the Taliban announced an all-male "caretaker" government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under their supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. The country faced economic collapse as foreign aid stopped and its central bank reserves abroad were frozen.

Anticipated (and actual) policies of the Taliban government

1. An exclusive Islamic Emirate.

The Taliban refused to form an inclusive government, appointing almost only their own Pashtun clerics and commanders, and rejected elections and the 2004 Constitution. (Reference: Taliban announcement of the caretaker cabinet, 7 September 2021; UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reports.)

2. Restrictions on women and girls.

Despite early promises, the Taliban kept girls' secondary schools closed from March 2022, banned women from universities in December 2022 and barred them from working with NGOs and the UN. (Reference: UNAMA, reports on the situation of women and girls, 2022–2024; UN Security Council resolution 2681 (2023).)

3. A strict social code.

The Law on the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (August 2024) imposed rules on dress, music, women's voices in public and men's beards, enforced by the morality police. (Reference: UNAMA, report on the implementation of the vice and virtue law, 2024.)

4. Counter-terrorism promises and doubts.

The Taliban promised not to allow attacks from Afghan soil, and they fight ISIS-Khorasan, but al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed by a US strike in Kabul in July 2022, and the TTP operates freely against Pakistan. (Reference: US Department of Defense statement, 1 August 2022; UN Security Council Monitoring Team reports, 2022–2024.)

5. A ban on poppy cultivation.

The Taliban banned opium poppy in April 2022, and cultivation fell by about 95 per cent in 2023, though farmers lost income without alternatives. (Reference: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2023.)

6. Economic self-reliance and trade.

The Taliban have collected customs revenue efficiently, kept the afghani stable and sought mining and trade deals, especially with China, Central Asia and Iran. (Reference: World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 2023–2024.)

7. Regional connectivity.

The Taliban support projects such as the Trans-Afghan (Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan) railway, TAPI and CASA-1000, presenting Afghanistan as a land bridge between Central and South Asia. (Reference: Uzbek, Afghan and Pakistani statements on the UAP railway, 2023–2025; Asian Development Bank on TAPI.)

8. A quest for recognition.

The Taliban seek international recognition and Afghanistan's seat at the UN, but refuse to compromise on women's rights. Russia became the first state to recognise them in July 2025, while China accepted a Taliban ambassador in January 2024. (Reference: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 July 2025; UN General Assembly Credentials Committee decisions, 2021–2024.)

The regional and global response

1. Pakistan: from hope to hostility.

Pakistan kept its embassy open and urged engagement, but relations deteriorated over the TTP, border fencing and refugees, leading to cross-border strikes and clashes by 2024–2025. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements; ISPR, 2022–2025.)

2. China: cautious engagement.

China kept its embassy open, appointed an ambassador in 2023, signed an oil exploration deal in the Amu Darya basin in January 2023 and agreed to extend CPEC to Afghanistan, while pressing the Taliban on Uyghur militants. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China; Afghan-Chinese contract with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company, January 2023.)

3. Russia and Central Asia: pragmatic security.

Russia removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations in 2025 and recognised their government, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan expanded trade and connectivity to stabilise their borders. (Reference: Supreme Court of Russia decision, April 2025; Moscow Format Consultations statements.)

4. Iran: engagement despite disputes.

Iran engages the Taliban on trade and security but disputes the sharing of the Helmand River waters, which led to a deadly border clash in May 2023, and has deported many Afghan migrants. (Reference: Helmand River Water Treaty, 1973; Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements, 2023.)

5. India: quiet return.

India reopened a "technical team" in Kabul in June 2022 and expanded engagement with the Taliban, culminating in Foreign Minister Muttaqi's visit to New Delhi in October 2025. (Reference: Ministry of External Affairs of India statements, June 2022 and October 2025.)

6. The United States and the West: isolation with humanitarian aid.

The US froze about US$7 billion of Afghan central bank assets, moved US$3.5 billion to the Afghan Fund in Switzerland in 2022, kept sanctions on Taliban leaders, and remained one of the largest humanitarian donors. (Reference: US Department of the Treasury, announcement of the Afghan Fund, 14 September 2022.)

7. The United Nations and the Doha process.

The Security Council adopted resolution 2593 (2021) on terrorism and safe passage and resolution 2615 (2021) to allow humanitarian aid despite sanctions, and the UN convened the Doha meetings of special envoys from 2023, which the Taliban attended in June–July 2024. (Reference: UN Security Council resolutions 2593 and 2615; UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Doha meetings.)

8. Humanitarian donors and international courts.

UN agencies have run one of the world's largest humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, and in July 2025 the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani for gender persecution. (Reference: UN OCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans; ICC press release, 8 July 2025.)

Challenges ahead

The Taliban's rule poses lasting challenges: the risk of terrorist groups using Afghan territory, a humanitarian crisis affecting millions, the denial of education and work to women, refugee flows to Pakistan and Iran, narcotics shifting to synthetic drugs, and disputes over water and borders. The world has chosen limited engagement without recognition, but this approach has neither changed the Taliban's policies nor met the needs of ordinary Afghans.

Conclusion

Nelson Mandela said: "Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world." By denying girls this weapon, the Taliban have chosen isolation over legitimacy. Their government has brought relative order and fewer large-scale battles, but its exclusive rule, treatment of women and tolerance of groups such as the TTP keep Afghanistan a regional and global concern. A coordinated regional approach, led by neighbours like Pakistan, China, Iran and the Central Asian states, that links engagement to counter-terrorism and basic rights offers the best hope for a stable Afghanistan.