What are the critical issues in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations since the Taliban took over Kabul in 2021.

Introduction

Allama Iqbal wrote in Persian that Asia is a body of water and clay, and the Afghan nation is its heart: "its corruption is the corruption of Asia, its prosperity the prosperity of Asia." For Pakistan, this is not poetry but daily reality. When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul on 15 August 2021, many in Pakistan expected a friendly government, secure borders and the end of India's influence in Afghanistan. Instead, relations have been marked by a surge in terrorism, border clashes, the forced return of refugees and deep mistrust. The critical issues between the two neighbours now shape Pakistan's internal security, economy and regional policy.

Overview

Pakistan had long supported a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan and helped facilitate the US-Taliban Doha Agreement of February 2020. After the Taliban's takeover, Pakistan kept its embassy open, hosted an OIC extraordinary session on Afghanistan in December 2021 and pressed the world to avoid an economic collapse there. But the Taliban released prisoners, refused to act against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and rejected the Durand Line as the border. Talks between Pakistan and the TTP, mediated by the Afghan Taliban, collapsed in November 2022, when the TTP ended its ceasefire. Since then, terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan has risen sharply, and relations have moved from cooperation to confrontation, culminating in border fighting in October 2025.

Critical issues in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations

1. TTP sanctuaries and the surge in terrorism.

The UN Monitoring Team reported that the TTP is one of the largest terrorist groups in Afghanistan and enjoys the support of the Taliban authorities. Terrorist attacks and deaths in Pakistan rose steadily after 2021, making 2024 one of the deadliest years in nearly a decade. (Reference: UN Security Council Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, report S/2024/556, July 2024; Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Annual Security Report 2024.)

2. The Durand Line dispute.

The Taliban, like earlier Afghan governments, do not recognise the Durand Line as the international border and have objected to Pakistan's fencing of the roughly 2,600 km frontier, at times removing parts of the fence. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements; ISPR on border fencing, 2021–2022.)

3. Border clashes and cross-border strikes.

Pakistan carried out strikes on what it called TTP hideouts in Afghanistan in March 2024 and December 2024. In October 2025, after Pakistani strikes and Taliban attacks on border posts, the heaviest fighting in years broke out; a ceasefire was agreed in Doha on 18–19 October 2025 with the mediation of Qatar and Turkey; follow-up talks in Istanbul agreed to maintain it but did not settle Pakistan's demand for verifiable action against the TTP. (Reference: ISPR statements, 2024–2025; Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, 19 October 2025; Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on the Istanbul talks, 30 October 2025.)

4. Repatriation of Afghan refugees.

Pakistan launched the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan in October 2023, and later extended it to Afghan Citizen Card holders, leading to the return of more than a million Afghans. Kabul condemned it, and the UN warned of a humanitarian crisis. (Reference: Ministry of Interior of Pakistan, October 2023; UNHCR and IOM, Afghanistan returns data, 2023–2025.)

5. Trade and transit disruptions.

Frequent closures of Torkham and Chaman crossings, disputes over transit trade and the smuggling of dollars and goods have reduced bilateral trade, while Afghanistan has diverted trade towards Iran and Central Asia. (Reference: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, trade with Afghanistan; Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement 2010; Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry reports.)

6. Recognition and diplomatic engagement.

Pakistan has not formally recognised the Taliban government, but it upgraded diplomatic relations to the level of ambassadors in May 2025 after a trilateral meeting with China. Russia became the first country to recognise the Taliban government in July 2025, raising questions about Pakistan's own position. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, 30 May 2025; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 July 2025.)

7. The India factor.

Contrary to Pakistan's expectations, the Taliban have engaged India. Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited New Delhi in October 2025, and India upgraded its mission in Kabul to an embassy, heightening Pakistan's fears of a two-front threat. (Reference: Ministry of External Affairs of India, joint statement, October 2025.)

8. Water, humanitarian and human-rights issues.

The Taliban have announced plans to build dams on the Kunar River, which flows into Pakistan, without any water-sharing treaty, while their bans on girls' education and women's work keep Afghanistan isolated and dependent on aid. (Reference: statements of the Taliban Ministry of Energy and Water, October 2025; UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), human rights reports.)

Way forward

Pakistan should combine firmness on terrorism with engagement. It must demand verifiable action against the TTP through bilateral mechanisms and regional platforms such as the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral and the guarantor-led Doha and Istanbul processes, while strengthening its own counter-terrorism capacity, governance in the former FATA and Balochistan, and border management. It should separate trade and people-to-people ties from security disputes by keeping crossings open, implementing transit agreements and pursuing connectivity projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway. Refugee returns should be gradual, voluntary where possible and coordinated with UNHCR. Pakistan should also open talks on the Kabul River basin before dams are built, and coordinate with regional states on a common approach to recognition, linking it to counter-terrorism commitments.

Conclusion

The Holy Quran says: "And if they incline to peace, then incline to it also and rely upon Allah" (Al-Anfal 8:61). Pakistan and Afghanistan share faith, ethnicity, trade and a long border; neither can escape the other. Since 2021, terrorism, border disputes, refugees and mistrust have turned hope into hostility. Peace on the western border requires the Taliban to end support for the TTP and Pakistan to pursue a policy that is firm on security but generous in trade, connectivity and people-to-people ties. If Afghanistan's prosperity is Asia's prosperity, as Iqbal believed, it is above all Pakistan's.