Critically analyze the key causes of delaying constriction of dams in Pakistan. Give some suggestions to revert this collateral loss.

Introduction

Benjamin Franklin wrote in Poor Richard's Almanack (1746): "When the well's dry, we know the worth of water." In 2018, the then Chief Justice of Pakistan launched a fund for the construction of dams, declaring that water scarcity was a matter of national survival. Whatever one thinks of judicial involvement, the concern was real. Pakistan can store only about 30 days of its average river flow, compared with around 1,000 days for Egypt's Aswan High Dam and several hundred days in other countries with large storage. Since Tarbela was completed in 1976, no large storage dam was completed for decades, while siltation has reduced the capacity of existing reservoirs. This delay has cost Pakistan dearly in lost water, electricity and flood protection.

Overview

The Indus Waters Treaty (1960) led to the construction of Mangla (1967) and Tarbela (1976) to replace the eastern rivers' waters allocated to India. After that, proposals for Kalabagh, Bhasha and other dams stalled for decades. Kalabagh, designed in the 1980s, was blocked by opposition from Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Diamer-Bhasha, inaugurated several times since 1998, finally began construction in 2020, and Mohmand Dam began in 2019. Meanwhile, Tarbela and Mangla lost a significant share of their storage capacity to silt.

Key causes of delay in dam construction

1. Lack of inter-provincial consensus.

The provincial assemblies of Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan passed resolutions against Kalabagh Dam, fearing water loss downstream and flooding of Nowshera upstream. No federal government was willing to proceed without consensus. (Reference: Provincial Assembly resolutions against Kalabagh Dam; WAPDA, Kalabagh Dam Project documents.)

2. Distrust over water distribution.

Sindh, as the lower riparian, fears that new storage will be used to divert water to Punjab, despite the Water Apportionment Accord of 1991. Disputes over IRSA's distribution deepen this distrust. (Reference: Water Apportionment Accord, 16 March 1991; Indus River System Authority Act 1992.)

3. Financing constraints.

Large dams cost billions of dollars. Diamer-Bhasha was estimated at around $14 billion, and international lenders hesitated because of its location in a disputed region. (Reference: WAPDA, Diamer-Bhasha Dam Project PC-I; reports on World Bank and ADB reluctance, 2012-2013.)

4. Political short-termism.

Dams take ten years or more to build, longer than any government's term, so politicians preferred quick projects. Foundation stones for Bhasha were laid repeatedly from 1998 onwards without real progress. (Reference: Ministry of Water Resources; Dawn reports on Diamer-Bhasha foundation stones.)

5. Displacement and resettlement issues.

Dams displace communities and submerge land and heritage. The resettlement of people affected by Mangla and Tarbela left grievances, and land acquisition for Diamer-Bhasha took years. (Reference: WAPDA, Diamer-Bhasha Dam Resettlement Action Plan; World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development, 2000.)

6. Technical and environmental concerns.

Critics raise concerns about seismic risk, siltation, downstream flows and the Indus Delta's ecology, which require careful study and add time. (Reference: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development, 2000; WWF-Pakistan studies on the Indus Delta.)

7. International and legal hurdles.

India has objected to projects in Gilgit-Baltistan, and disputes under the Indus Waters Treaty over India's own projects affect Pakistan's water planning. (Reference: Indus Waters Treaty, 1960; Permanent Court of Arbitration, Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, Final Award, December 2013.)

8. Weak institutional capacity.

Bureaucratic delays, frequent changes in project management and weak planning in WAPDA and the Ministry of Water Resources have slowed approvals and execution. (Reference: Planning Commission, project evaluation reports; National Water Policy 2018.)

The collateral loss

The delay has had heavy costs. Pakistan lets millions of acre-feet of water flow into the sea in flood years while facing shortages in dry seasons. The loss of cheap hydropower pushed the country towards expensive imported fuel, contributing to high tariffs and circular debt. Inadequate storage also reduced flood protection, as the 2010 and 2022 floods showed, and limited irrigation for a growing population.

Suggestions to reverse the loss

1. Consensus through the CCI.

Dam decisions should be taken through the Council of Common Interests, with independent technical studies shared openly with all provinces. (Reference: Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 153-155.)

2. Transparency in water distribution.

Installing telemetry at all barrages and publishing real-time flow data would build trust that stored water will be shared under the 1991 Accord. (Reference: IRSA telemetry project; Water Apportionment Accord 1991.)

3. Innovative financing.

Combining federal funds, WAPDA's own resources, green bonds and public-private partnerships can finance dams. WAPDA's green Eurobond (2021) raised $500 million for hydropower. (Reference: WAPDA press release on the Green Eurobond, May 2021; Supreme Court and Prime Minister's Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dams Fund, 2018.)

4. Fair resettlement.

Generous compensation, new housing and livelihoods for affected communities, and their participation in decisions, would reduce local opposition. (Reference: World Bank, Environmental and Social Framework, 2018; WAPDA resettlement policies.)

5. Prioritising feasible dams.

Focus on projects with consensus and completed studies, such as Diamer-Bhasha, Mohmand and Dasu, while continuing dialogue on contested ones. (Reference: National Water Policy 2018; WAPDA project status reports.)

6. Small and medium dams.

Hundreds of small dams in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Potohar region can store rainwater, recharge groundwater and support local agriculture quickly and cheaply. (Reference: Ministry of Water Resources, small dams programme; Balochistan Irrigation Department.)

7. Institutional reform of WAPDA and IRSA.

Strengthening planning, project management and accountability would speed execution. (Reference: National Water Policy 2018, institutional reforms section.)

8. Water conservation alongside storage.

Lining canals, efficient irrigation and pricing water realistically can save as much water as new dams, complementing storage. (Reference: National Water Policy 2018; World Bank, Pakistan: Getting More from Water, 2019.)

Conclusion

The Holy Quran reminds us: "And We made from water every living thing" (Surah Al-Anbiya, 21:30). For Pakistan, storing that water is a matter of survival. Dam construction has been delayed by provincial distrust, financing gaps, political short-termism, resettlement problems and weak institutions, at a heavy cost in lost water, power and flood protection. By building consensus through the CCI, ensuring transparency, finding innovative finance, resettling affected people fairly and combining large dams with small dams and conservation, Pakistan can reverse this loss and secure its water future.