Why did Pakistan join Western Defense Pacts? What cost it had to pay for that? Explain.

Introduction

In his book Friends Not Masters (1967), President Ayub Khan wrote that Pakistan sought friends, not masters, in its relations with the great powers. The title captures the hope and the disappointment of Pakistan's alliance with the West. In the 1950s Pakistan joined the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (1954), SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), later CENTO, becoming what was often called America's "most allied ally" in Asia. The alliances brought arms and aid, but when Pakistan needed help most, in the wars of 1965 and 1971, its Western allies did not stand by it, and the price of alignment proved heavy.

Overview

At first Pakistan sought good relations with both blocs; Liaquat Ali Khan received an invitation to Moscow in 1949 but visited Washington in May 1950 instead. Over the next years Pakistan moved firmly into the Western camp. It signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States in May 1954, joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in September 1955, which became the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1959 after Iraq withdrew. In March 1959 it signed a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the US. Pakistan left SEATO in 1972 and CENTO in 1979.

Why Pakistan joined the Western defence pacts

1. Security against India.

Pakistan felt threatened by a much larger India with which it had fought over Kashmir in 1947-48. Western arms offered a way to balance India's military superiority. (Reference: S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1973.)

2. The Kashmir dispute.

Pakistan hoped that Western allies would support it in the UN Security Council and pressure India to hold the plebiscite promised in UN resolutions. (Reference: UN Security Council Resolutions 47 (1948) and 91 (1951); Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001.)

3. A weak defence inheritance.

Pakistan received far less than its share of military stores at partition, and many items allocated to it were never delivered. It needed modern weapons, training and equipment. (Reference: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Sang-e-Meel, 2000; Partition Council records on division of military assets.)

4. Economic hardship.

The new state faced refugees, a lack of industry and a shortage of capital. US economic aid, food assistance and loans were seen as essential for survival and development. (Reference: Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 2001; Government of Pakistan, First Five-Year Plan 1955-60.)

5. Fear of Soviet and Afghan pressure.

Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's admission to the UN in 1947 and raised the "Pakhtunistan" issue, while the Soviet Union loomed beyond it. Alliance with the West offered protection on the north-western frontier. (Reference: UN General Assembly records, admission of Pakistan, September 1947; Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1973.)

6. US Cold War strategy.

The United States sought to contain Soviet communism through a chain of alliances from Europe to East Asia, and Pakistan's location between the Middle East and South-East Asia made it valuable. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles actively sought Pakistan's membership. (Reference: Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 2001; Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan, Columbia University Press, 1994.)

7. The outlook of the ruling elite.

British-trained bureaucrats and army officers, such as Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan, were pro-Western and saw alliance with the West as natural. Ayub, then Commander-in-Chief, personally lobbied in Washington in 1953. (Reference: Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Law, Cambridge University Press, 1990.)

8. Hopes of Muslim and Western support.

The Baghdad Pact included Muslim neighbours Turkey, Iran and Iraq, which made it acceptable domestically and promised regional cooperation alongside security. (Reference: Pact of Mutual Cooperation (Baghdad Pact), 24 February 1955; Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1973.)

The cost Pakistan had to pay

1. Soviet hostility and vetoes on Kashmir.

The Soviet Union began openly backing India on Kashmir. Khrushchev declared in Srinagar in December 1955 that Kashmir was part of India, and the Soviet Union vetoed Security Council resolutions on Kashmir in 1957 and 1962. (Reference: UN Security Council records, 1957 and 1962; McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 1994.)

2. Afghan-Soviet alignment.

The Soviet Union supported Afghanistan's Pakhtunistan claims and armed it, which created a hostile front on Pakistan's western border. (Reference: Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1973.)

3. The U-2 incident.

When an American U-2 spy plane that had taken off from Badaber near Peshawar was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960, Khrushchev threatened Pakistan, reportedly saying he had circled Peshawar on the map. Pakistan had become a target because of its allies. (Reference: Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 2001; Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 1967.)

4. Alienation from the Arab world and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Membership of the Baghdad Pact angered Egypt's Nasser and other Arab nationalists, especially after the Suez crisis of 1956, when Pakistan's position was seen as too close to Britain. Pakistan was also kept out of the Non-Aligned Movement for decades. (Reference: Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1973; Non-Aligned Movement, membership records.)

5. Betrayal in 1965 and 1971.

During the 1965 war the US imposed an arms embargo on both countries, which hurt Pakistan far more because it relied on American weapons. In 1971 SEATO and CENTO offered no help as East Pakistan was lost. (Reference: Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 2001; Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report.)

6. Western arming of India after 1962.

After the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the US and Britain rushed military aid to India, Pakistan's main adversary, without securing any progress on Kashmir. Pakistan felt its alliance had been ignored. (Reference: McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 1994; Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, 1967.)

7. Dependence and military dominance.

US aid strengthened the army relative to civilian institutions and made Pakistan dependent on foreign arms and money, which contributed to the military's dominance in politics, as in the 1958 coup. (Reference: Jalal, The State of Martial Law, 1990; Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, PublicAffairs, 2013.)

8. Delayed ties with China and the Third World.

Alliance with the West initially limited Pakistan's freedom to build ties with China and the newly independent states. Only after 1962 did Pakistan build its strategic friendship with China, beginning with the border agreement of March 1963. (Reference: Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, 2 March 1963; Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis, Hurst, 2015.)

Conclusion

In his Farewell Address of 1796, George Washington advised: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." The Western alliances of the 1950s gave Pakistan arms, aid and training at a time of acute insecurity, but they also earned it Soviet hostility, Afghan pressure, Arab suspicion and, finally, abandonment in 1965 and 1971. The experience taught Pakistan that alliances serve the interests of the stronger partner and that true security comes from internal strength, regional peace and balanced relations with all major powers, a lesson that remains relevant as Pakistan navigates rivalry between the United States and China today.