Discuss revival of Pak-US relations in context of present US-Taliban peace process.

Introduction

On 1 January 2018, President Donald Trump tweeted that the United States had "foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit," and soon afterwards suspended security assistance. Less than two years later, he welcomed Prime Minister Imran Khan to the White House and praised Pakistan's help in Afghanistan. The cause of this dramatic turnaround was the US-Taliban peace process. Washington needed Islamabad to bring the Taliban to the table, and the resulting cooperation revived a relationship that had reached one of its lowest points.

Overview

In January 2018 the US suspended most security assistance to Pakistan, and in August 2018 it cut Pakistan from the IMET military training programme. But Trump wanted to end America's longest war. He appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation in September 2018. Pakistan helped arrange talks, and after nine rounds in Doha, the US and the Taliban signed the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan on 29 February 2020, providing for US troop withdrawal in return for Taliban counter-terrorism guarantees and intra-Afghan negotiations.

How the peace process revived Pak-US relations

1. Trump's letter seeking help.

In December 2018 President Trump wrote to Imran Khan asking for Pakistan's help in the Afghan peace process, marking a shift from pressure to engagement. (Reference: Prime Minister's Office of Pakistan statement on President Trump's letter, 3 December 2018.)

2. Release of Mullah Baradar and facilitation of talks.

Pakistan released Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in October 2018, reportedly at US request, and he later led the Taliban delegation in Doha. Pakistan used its influence to bring the Taliban to direct talks with the US. (Reference: Reports of Reuters and The New York Times, October 2018; US State Department statements on the Doha talks, 2019.)

3. Imran Khan's White House visit.

On 22 July 2019 President Trump hosted Imran Khan, praised Pakistan's cooperation and said the US was working with Pakistan "to find a way out" of Afghanistan. (Reference: The White House, remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Khan before bilateral meeting, 22 July 2019.)

4. Restoration of IMET.

In December 2019 the US approved resumption of Pakistan's participation in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, signalling restored military ties. (Reference: US State Department statement on IMET for Pakistan, December 2019.)

5. Mediation offer and warmer rhetoric.

During the July 2019 visit, Trump offered to mediate on Kashmir, a long-standing Pakistani wish, and repeated the offer after August 2019, though India rejected it. (Reference: The White House, remarks of 22 July 2019; Ministry of External Affairs of India statement, July 2019.)

6. High-level engagement.

Trump and Imran Khan met again at the UN General Assembly (September 2019) and at Davos (January 2020), and senior officials, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, visited Islamabad. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan press releases, September 2019 and January 2020; US State Department, Secretary Pompeo's visit to Islamabad, September 2018.)

7. The Doha Agreement.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister attended the signing of the Doha Agreement on 29 February 2020, and US officials publicly acknowledged Pakistan's role, giving the relationship a shared achievement. (Reference: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 29 February 2020; statements of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, 2020.)

8. A new economic agenda.

Both sides spoke of moving from "aid to trade", with Pakistan seeking greater market access and investment, and a US-Pakistan Business Council and trade discussions were revived. (Reference: Ministry of Commerce of Pakistan, US-Pakistan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council meetings; US Chamber of Commerce, US-Pakistan Business Council.)

Limits of the revival

1. A transactional relationship.

The revival was tied almost entirely to Afghanistan, and Pakistan worried that US interest would fade once American troops left, as had happened after 1989. (Reference: Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, 2001.)

2. The India factor.

The US continued to deepen its strategic partnership with India, including defence agreements such as BECA (2020), limiting how far it would accommodate Pakistan. (Reference: US-India Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, October 2020; US Indo-Pacific Strategy, 2019.)

3. Differences over CPEC.

Senior US diplomat Alice Wells criticised CPEC in November 2019 and January 2020, warning of debt and lack of transparency, which Pakistan and China rejected. (Reference: Remarks by Ambassador Alice Wells at the Wilson Center, 21 November 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan response.)

4. FATF and terror financing.

Pakistan remained on the FATF grey list, and the US continued to press for action against groups targeting India and Afghanistan. (Reference: FATF plenary outcomes, 2019-2020.)

5. The Afghan government's suspicion.

President Ashraf Ghani's government distrusted Pakistan's role and the US-Taliban deal, which complicated the peace process. (Reference: Statements of the Government of Afghanistan, 2019-2020.)

6. The risk of blame for failure.

Pakistan feared that if the peace process failed, it would again be blamed, which happened after the Taliban takeover in August 2021. (Reference: Testimony of Secretary Antony Blinken, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 13 September 2021.)

7. Domestic politics in both countries.

US politics and the 2020 election, and political instability in Pakistan, limited long-term planning. (Reference: Congressional Research Service, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, 2020.)

8. The post-withdrawal chill.

After the US withdrawal, relations cooled sharply under President Biden, showing that the revival had not built a broader foundation. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements, 2021; White House statements, 2021.)

Conclusion

Prime Minister Imran Khan wrote in The Washington Post in June 2021 that Pakistan was "ready to be a partner for peace in Afghanistan," but would not host US bases. The US-Taliban peace process revived Pak-US relations from the low point of 2018 through Trump's letter, Pakistan's facilitation, the White House visit, restored military training and the Doha Agreement. Yet the revival remained transactional and tied to Afghanistan, as the chill after 2021 showed. A durable relationship requires broadening ties to trade, investment, education and climate, beyond the shifting needs of war.