Explain "Afghans' owned, Afghans' led" solution of Afghanistan crisis.

Introduction

Afghanistan is often called the "graveyard of empires" because the British in the nineteenth century, the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the United States and NATO in the twenty-first century all failed to impose their will on it. Each foreign intervention produced resistance, civil war and refugees. From this history came the principle, adopted by the UN Security Council and consistently advocated by Pakistan, that peace in Afghanistan must be "Afghan-led and Afghan-owned": a settlement designed and agreed by Afghans themselves, with the region and the world supporting rather than dictating it.

Overview

Afghanistan has seen the Soviet invasion (1979-89), civil war (1992-96), Taliban rule (1996-2001), the US-led intervention (2001-21) and the return of the Taliban in August 2021. The Bonn Conference (2001) created a new political order, but it excluded the Taliban, who soon launched an insurgency. After years of fighting, the international community accepted that there was no military solution. The Doha Agreement of 29 February 2020 between the US and the Taliban was to be followed by intra-Afghan negotiations, which began in Doha on 12 September 2020 but stalled as the US withdrew and the Afghan government collapsed.

Meaning and principles of an Afghan-owned, Afghan-led solution

1. Respect for Afghan sovereignty.

The solution rests on the principle that Afghans alone must decide their political future, free from foreign occupation or dictation, in line with the UN Charter's principles of sovereignty and non-interference. (Reference: Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4) and 2(7); UN Security Council Resolution 2513 (2020).)

2. Intra-Afghan dialogue.

Peace must come from direct negotiations between all Afghan parties, including the government of the day, the Taliban and political leaders, rather than from deals made only between foreign powers and one faction. (Reference: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, Doha, 29 February 2020, Part Two; UN Security Council Resolution 2513 (2020).)

3. Inclusivity.

A lasting settlement must include all ethnic groups (Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek and others), women, minorities and civil society, so that no group feels excluded and turns to violence. (Reference: UN Security Council Resolution 2593 (2021); UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) mandate.)

4. No military solution.

Forty years of war showed that no side, foreign or Afghan, can win militarily. Political negotiation is the only route to peace. (Reference: Statements of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan policy statements on Afghanistan.)

5. An Afghan-designed constitutional order.

The future system of government must be agreed by Afghans, through traditional institutions such as the Loya Jirga and modern ones such as parliament, rather than being designed abroad as at Bonn. (Reference: Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan (Bonn Agreement), 5 December 2001; Consultative Loya Jirga for Peace, Kabul, August 2020.)

6. Reconciliation and amnesty.

Prisoner releases, amnesty for fighters and reintegration programmes help build trust. The release of thousands of Taliban and government prisoners in 2020 was a step in this direction. (Reference: Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, 2020, provisions on prisoner exchange; Afghan Consultative Loya Jirga resolution, August 2020.)

7. Regional support without interference.

Neighbours and major powers, including Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia and the Central Asian states, should support an Afghan settlement and refrain from backing proxies. (Reference: Moscow Format consultations joint statements, 2021; Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process declarations.)

8. Afghan control over reconstruction.

Aid and development should be directed by Afghan priorities and institutions rather than by foreign contractors, so that Afghans own the rebuilding of their country. (Reference: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), What We Need to Learn, August 2021.)

Pakistan's support for the Afghan-led process and the challenges

1. The Murree talks (2015).

Pakistan hosted the first officially acknowledged talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban at Murree on 7 July 2015, with US and Chinese observers. The process stalled after the death of Mullah Omar was announced. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, press release, 8 July 2015.)

2. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group.

In January 2016 Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US and China formed the QCG to prepare a roadmap for Afghan-led talks. (Reference: Joint press statements of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, January-February 2016.)

3. Facilitating US-Taliban talks.

Pakistan helped bring the Taliban to the table in Doha, and the US acknowledged its role. Pakistan's Foreign Minister attended the signing of the Doha Agreement in February 2020. (Reference: US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad's statements, 2019-2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, press release, 29 February 2020.)

4. Support for intra-Afghan negotiations.

Pakistan welcomed the start of intra-Afghan talks in September 2020, hosted Afghan political leaders and Taliban delegations in Islamabad, and repeatedly urged both sides to agree on a ceasefire. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, statements on intra-Afghan negotiations, September 2020; Dawn, reports on Taliban and Afghan delegations in Islamabad, 2020.)

5. Regional diplomacy.

Pakistan coordinated with China, Russia, Iran and Central Asian states through the extended troika and meetings of Afghanistan's neighbours, and hosted the OIC extraordinary session on Afghanistan in December 2021. (Reference: OIC, resolution of the 17th Extraordinary Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Islamabad, 19 December 2021.)

6. Border management and APAPPS.

Pakistan fenced most of the border and signed the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) in 2018 to manage security and cooperation through institutional mechanisms. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, APAPPS announcement, May 2018; ISPR updates on border fencing.)

7. Trade and transit.

Pakistan offered transit trade, new border crossings and connectivity projects such as rail links to Central Asia, recognising that economic interdependence supports peace. (Reference: Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) 2010; UAP railway framework agreement, 2023.)

8. Challenges after 2021.

The Taliban government has not formed an inclusive administration, has restricted girls' education and remains unrecognised internationally, while attacks by the TTP from Afghan soil have strained relations with Pakistan. An Afghan-led solution must also be inclusive and respect the security of neighbours. (Reference: UNAMA, Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan updates, 2022-2023; UN Security Council, Monitoring Team reports on the TTP, 2023.)

Conclusion

Allama Iqbal wrote in Zarb-e-Kaleem that Asia is a body of water and clay in which the Afghan nation is the heart: "Asia yak paikar-e-aab-o-gil ast, millat-e-Afghan dar aan paikar dil ast; az fasad-e-oo fasad-e-Asia, dar kushad-e-oo kushad-e-Asia" (If it is in turmoil, all Asia is in turmoil; if it is at peace, all Asia is at peace). An Afghan-owned, Afghan-led solution recognises that only Afghans can bring lasting peace to their country, with neighbours and the world as supporters rather than masters. Pakistan has backed this principle through Murree, the QCG, Doha and regional diplomacy. Its success now depends on an inclusive Afghan government that respects its people's rights and its neighbours' security.