Write note on the Afghan War since 1979 and its impacts on Pakistan. How far the emergence of the "Non-State Actors" and Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan can be attributed to the decades-long warfare in Afghanistan?

Introduction

After the Soviet invasion of December 1979, President Zia-ul-Haq, according to Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf's The Bear Trap (1992), held that the water in Afghanistan must "boil at the right temperature." Pakistan became the frontline state in a proxy war between the superpowers, and the conflict in its western neighbour has continued in different forms ever since: the Soviet war, civil war, Taliban rule, the US-led intervention and the return of the Taliban. Few countries have been as deeply affected by a neighbour's wars as Pakistan, which has absorbed millions of refugees and suffered the rise of non-state armed groups and new security threats.

Overview

The Soviet invasion (December 1979) led to a decade-long war in which the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan backed the Afghan mujahideen. The Geneva Accords (1988) led to Soviet withdrawal in February 1989. Civil war among mujahideen factions followed (1992-96), until the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. After 9/11, the US-led coalition overthrew the Taliban, but an insurgency continued until the Doha Agreement (2020) and the Taliban's return in August 2021.

Impacts of the Afghan war on Pakistan

1. Afghan refugees.

At its peak in the 1980s, Pakistan hosted more than 3 million Afghan refugees, and millions remained for decades, straining resources, labour markets and security. (Reference: UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, 2000; UNHCR, Pakistan operational data portal.)

2. Weapons and the Kalashnikov culture.

Billions of dollars' worth of weapons supplied to the mujahideen leaked into Pakistan's markets, spreading automatic weapons across society and fuelling crime and ethnic violence. (Reference: Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Penguin, 2004; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Yale University Press, 2000.)

3. Drugs and addiction.

The war turned the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region into a centre of opium and heroin production and trafficking, and drug addiction rose sharply in Pakistan. (Reference: UNODC, Drug Use in Pakistan 2013; UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trade reports.)

4. Economic costs and benefits.

Pakistan received US and Saudi aid in the 1980s and after 2001, but the war on terror cost it an estimated $127 billion between 2001 and 2018 in direct and indirect losses. (Reference: Finance Division, Pakistan Economic Survey 2017-18, annex on the war on terror; Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 2001.)

5. Rise of militant networks.

Thousands of madrassas and training camps established during the jihad produced fighters and networks, some of which later turned towards Kashmir, sectarian targets or the Pakistani state. (Reference: International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, Asia Report No. 36, 2002.)

6. Sectarianism.

The war coincided with the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Saudi rivalry, and sectarian militant groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and Tehrik-e-Jafaria emerged in the 1980s, with some fighters trained in Afghanistan. (Reference: Vali Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan", Modern Asian Studies, 2000.)

7. Strained Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

Afghan governments, from Karzai and Ghani to the Taliban after 2021, have accused Pakistan of interference, while Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of sheltering anti-Pakistan militants, poisoning relations. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements; UN Security Council, Monitoring Team reports on the TTP, 2023.)

8. Terrorism after 2001.

The US-led war pushed militants into Pakistan's tribal areas, leading to the formation of the TTP (2007) and a wave of terrorism that killed tens of thousands of Pakistanis. (Reference: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Reports; South Asia Terrorism Portal.)

How far non-state actors and non-traditional threats can be attributed to the Afghan war

1. Jihadi networks.

The Afghan jihad created networks of trained fighters, funding sources and ideology that later gave rise to many non-state armed groups operating in Pakistan. (Reference: Coll, Ghost Wars, 2004.)

2. The TTP.

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan emerged directly from the post-2001 Afghan conflict, and after 2021 it regained strength from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. (Reference: UN Security Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reports, 2023.)

3. Weapons and drug economies.

Arms and narcotics economies created by the war finance militant groups and criminal gangs, a major non-traditional threat. (Reference: UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trade reports.)

4. Refugee camps as recruitment grounds.

Poorly regulated camps and madrassas provided recruits for militant groups during the 1980s and 1990s. (Reference: International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 36, 2002.)

5. Domestic policies.

Pakistan's own decisions, such as supporting militant groups as strategic assets in Afghanistan and Kashmir and Zia-era Islamisation, also nurtured non-state actors. (Reference: Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Carnegie Endowment, 2005.)

6. Weak governance.

The lack of state authority in the former tribal areas under the colonial Frontier Crimes Regulation, along with poverty and poor education, created fertile ground for militancy. (Reference: Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901; Report of the Committee on FATA Reforms, 2016.)

7. Sectarian funding.

Foreign funding of sectarian organisations, linked to the Iran-Saudi rivalry rather than Afghanistan, drove sectarian militancy. (Reference: Vali Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan", 2000.)

8. Regional rivalries.

Hostile states have used non-state actors as proxies, and non-traditional threats such as climate change, water scarcity and cyber attacks have causes unrelated to Afghanistan. (Reference: International Court of Justice, Jadhav Case, 2019; National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026.)

Conclusion

Asked in 1998 by Le Nouvel Observateur whether he regretted arming the Afghan mujahideen, former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski replied: "What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?" For the great powers, Afghanistan was a chessboard; for Pakistan, it was next door. The Afghan war since 1979 brought Pakistan refugees, weapons, drugs, militant networks, sectarianism and terrorism, along with temporary foreign aid. A large part of the rise of non-state actors and non-traditional security threats can be traced to these decades of warfare, but not all of it: Pakistan's own policies, weak governance in the tribal areas, sectarian funding and regional rivalries also played major roles. Lasting security requires both peace in Afghanistan and reform at home.