What is meant by the term "Proxy War"? Are there any extrinsic factors at play in the internal security situation of Pakistan?

Introduction

The political scientist Andrew Mumford, in Proxy Warfare (Polity, 2013), defines proxy wars as "the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome." Rather than fighting each other directly, states arm, fund, train or shelter local groups to fight for their interests. Pakistan has experienced proxy wars both as a participant, in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and as a victim, as hostile actors have exploited its internal faultlines. Terrorism, insurgency in Balochistan and sectarian violence in Pakistan have deep domestic roots, but external actors have repeatedly fuelled them.

Meaning of proxy war and its history

A proxy war is a conflict in which a major power uses a third party, often a non-state armed group or a smaller state, as a substitute for direct involvement. Proxies give the sponsor deniability and lower costs. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union fought through proxies in Korea, Vietnam, Angola and Afghanistan. In the Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia have backed rival groups in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. Modern proxy wars often combine armed groups with cyber attacks, propaganda and economic pressure, overlapping with what is called hybrid or fifth-generation warfare.

Extrinsic factors in Pakistan's internal security

1. Hostile intelligence agencies and Balochistan.

Pakistan has long accused India of supporting Baloch separatists and the TTP. The arrest in March 2016 of Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian naval officer operating under a false identity, who confessed to espionage and sabotage in Balochistan and Karachi, is Pakistan's main evidence. (Reference: International Court of Justice, Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan), Judgment of 17 July 2019; ISPR press conference, 29 March 2016.)

2. Sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

The TTP's leadership and fighters have operated from Afghan territory since the military operations of 2014, and attacks rose sharply after the Taliban takeover in 2021. The UN has reported thousands of TTP fighters in Afghanistan. (Reference: UN Security Council, Thirty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements.)

3. The legacy of the Afghan wars.

The proxy war of the 1980s, in which Pakistan, the US and Saudi Arabia backed the mujahideen against the Soviet Union, flooded Pakistan with weapons, drugs and militants, creating the "Kalashnikov culture" that still feeds violence. (Reference: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Yale University Press, 2000; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Penguin, 2004.)

4. The Iran-Saudi rivalry and sectarianism.

Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran and Saudi Arabia have funded rival religious organisations and seminaries in Pakistan, contributing to sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia militant groups in the 1980s and 1990s. (Reference: Vali Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 34, 2000; Mariam Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan", in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?, 2002.)

5. Great-power competition and CPEC.

Attacks on Chinese nationals and CPEC projects, such as the Dasu bus attack (July 2021) and the Karachi University attack (April 2022), are seen in Pakistan as attempts by hostile actors to sabotage the corridor and Pakistan-China ties. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements, 2021-2022; Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2022.)

6. Financing of militancy from abroad.

Charities, hawala networks and donors in the Gulf and elsewhere have financed militant groups, which is why Pakistan was placed on the FATF grey list (2018-2022) and had to overhaul its anti-money-laundering laws. (Reference: Financial Action Task Force, Mutual Evaluation Report of Pakistan, Asia/Pacific Group, 2019; Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act 2020.)

7. Disinformation campaigns.

Networks such as those exposed by the EU DisinfoLab in Indian Chronicles (2020) amplified separatist narratives and anti-Pakistan lobbying at the UN and EU, a non-violent dimension of proxy war. (Reference: EU DisinfoLab, Indian Chronicles, December 2020.)

8. Spillover from global jihadist networks.

Al-Qaeda and later ISIS-Khorasan recruited in Pakistan and carried out attacks, such as the Bajaur rally bombing (July 2023), linking Pakistan's security to global jihadist movements. (Reference: US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2022; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police statements on the Bajaur attack, July 2023.)

Intrinsic factors that make proxies effective

External actors succeed only where internal weaknesses exist. Underdevelopment and grievances in Balochistan and ex-FATA, weak policing and prosecution, unregulated seminaries, sectarian hate speech, poverty, unemployment and political instability give foreign sponsors recruits and narratives. Pakistan's own past use of militant proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir also created groups that later turned against the state. A credible response must therefore address both extrinsic and intrinsic factors.

Way forward

1. Full implementation of the National Action Plan.

The NAP (2014), revised in 2021, provides a framework against terrorism, hate speech, terror financing and militant organisations. (Reference: Ministry of Interior, National Action Plan, 2014 and revised NAP, 2021.)

2. Border management.

Completing the fencing of the Afghan and Iranian borders and modernising border crossings reduces infiltration. (Reference: ISPR, updates on border fencing; Ministry of Interior.)

3. Diplomacy with Afghanistan.

Pakistan should press the Afghan Taliban, bilaterally and through the region, to act against the TTP. (Reference: UN Security Council Resolution 2593 (2021); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements.)

4. Development and inclusion in Balochistan and ex-FATA.

Jobs, education and political participation reduce the appeal of separatists and militants. (Reference: Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package, 2009; Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act 2018.)

5. Stronger counter-terrorism institutions.

Empowering NACTA, provincial CTDs and prosecution services improves intelligence and convictions. (Reference: National Counter Terrorism Authority Act 2013.)

6. Curbing terror financing.

Sustaining the reforms made under FATF keeps money away from proxies. (Reference: FATF plenary outcome, October 2022.)

7. Regulating seminaries and countering sectarianism.

Registration of madrassas and enforcement against hate speech weaken sectarian proxies. (Reference: Paigham-e-Pakistan, 2018; Ministry of Federal Education, Directorate General of Religious Education.)

8. Exposing external involvement internationally.

Pakistan should present evidence, such as dossiers and the Jadhav case, at international forums. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, dossier on Indian involvement in terrorism, November 2020.)

Conclusion

Sun Tzu advised: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." Pakistan faces a proxy war in which hostile agencies, Afghan sanctuaries, regional rivalries, foreign financing and disinformation all play a part. But proxies succeed only by exploiting internal grievances and weaknesses. By implementing the National Action Plan, securing its borders, engaging Afghanistan, developing neglected regions and exposing foreign involvement, Pakistan can deny its enemies the ground on which proxy wars are fought.