Discuss the possibilities of progress under the recently agreed rubric of comprehensive dialogue between Pakistan and India. In your opinion what are the major constraints at present?

Introduction

During his visit to Lahore in February 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee wrote at the Minar-e-Pakistan: "A stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan is in India's interest." Such moments of hope have punctuated a relationship marked by wars and crises. In December 2015, after a long freeze, Pakistan and India agreed to begin a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue (CBD), and Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a surprise stop in Lahore on 25 December 2015. The new framework offered real possibilities of progress on several issues, but the constraints, above all terrorism, Kashmir and mistrust, were formidable.

Overview

The Composite Dialogue, agreed in 1997 and resumed in 2004, covered eight subjects, including Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, terrorism and trade. It made progress until the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 suspended it. After years of limited contacts, the two Prime Ministers met at Ufa in July 2015, their National Security Advisers met in Bangkok on 6 December 2015, and on 9 December 2015, during the Heart of Asia conference in Islamabad, the foreign ministers announced the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue. It included peace and security, CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul, economic and commercial cooperation, counter-terrorism, narcotics, humanitarian issues, people-to-people exchanges and religious tourism.

Possibilities of progress under the comprehensive dialogue

1. Sir Creek.

The dispute over the maritime boundary in Sir Creek is largely technical; the two sides completed a joint survey in 2007 and were reported to be close to agreement, making it a candidate for early settlement. (Reference: Joint statements of the Composite Dialogue rounds, 2006–2008; Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove, 2015.)

2. Siachen.

Both sides lose soldiers to weather on the world's highest battlefield; proposals for demilitarisation discussed in 1989 and 1992 showed that an agreement was possible. (Reference: Pakistan-India joint statement on Siachen, June 1989; reports on the Gayari avalanche, April 2012.)

3. Trade normalisation.

In 2012, Pakistan moved towards granting India non-discriminatory market access, and the Wagah-Attari trade route was expanded; completing this could raise bilateral trade several-fold. (Reference: Ministry of Commerce of Pakistan, 2012; World Bank, A Glass Half Full, 2018.)

4. Visas and people-to-people contacts.

The 2012 visa agreement eased travel for businesspeople, pilgrims and the elderly; expanding it would build constituencies for peace. (Reference: Pakistan-India Agreement on Visas, September 2012.)

5. Religious tourism.

The 1974 Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines allows pilgrims to visit holy sites; opening more shrines, as later happened with the Kartarpur Corridor in 2019, offers goodwill. (Reference: Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines, 1974; Kartarpur Corridor Agreement, 24 October 2019.)

6. Nuclear and military CBMs.

Existing agreements, such as the 1988 non-attack on nuclear installations, the 2005 missile test pre-notification and the 2007 agreement on nuclear accidents, could be expanded, including hotlines and the 2003 LoC ceasefire. (Reference: Pakistan-India agreements of 1988, 2005 and 2007; 2003 ceasefire understanding.)

7. Humanitarian issues.

Releasing fishermen and prisoners under the 2008 Agreement on Consular Access and returning those who stray across borders build public goodwill. (Reference: Pakistan-India Agreement on Consular Access, 21 May 2008.)

8. Kashmir through back-channel ideas.

The back-channel of 2004–2007 discussed proposals such as demilitarisation, self-governance and joint mechanisms, showing that creative ideas exist if the political will returns. (Reference: Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove, 2015; Pervez Musharraf's four-point proposals, 2006.)

Major constraints

1. Terrorism and the Pathankot attack.

Just a week after Modi's Lahore visit, militants attacked the Pathankot airbase on 2 January 2016, and India postponed the talks, showing how a single attack can derail the process. (Reference: Ministry of External Affairs of India statements, January 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements.)

2. The Kashmir dispute.

Pakistan insists that Kashmir is the core issue, while India avoids substantive talks on it; the July 2016 killing of Burhan Wani and the unrest that followed hardened positions. (Reference: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan statements, July 2016; UN OHCHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir, 2018.)

3. India's preconditions.

India linked dialogue to action against groups it blames for attacks, while Pakistan rejected preconditions and sought a comprehensive agenda. (Reference: Statements of India's External Affairs Ministry and Pakistan's Foreign Office, 2016.)

4. Domestic politics.

Hindu nationalist politics in India and political pressures in Pakistan make concessions costly for leaders on both sides. (Reference: Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi's India, 2021; Pakistani parliamentary debates on India, 2016.)

5. A deep trust deficit.

Decades of war and crises have created suspicion among the public, the media and security establishments, making every step hostage to mistrust. (Reference: Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum, 2013.)

6. Water disputes.

Disagreements over Indian projects on the western rivers, such as Kishanganga and Ratle, under the Indus Waters Treaty added a new source of tension. (Reference: Permanent Court of Arbitration, Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, final award of December 2013.)

7. Afghanistan and Balochistan allegations.

Pakistan's arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav in March 2016 and accusations of Indian interference in Balochistan, as well as Indian accusations about Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, poisoned the atmosphere. (Reference: ISPR statements, March 2016; Ministry of External Affairs of India statements.)

8. No mechanism to insulate talks.

Unlike some other peace processes, there was no agreement to continue dialogue despite attacks, so the process stopped whenever violence occurred. (Reference: Analyses of the India-Pakistan peace process by the Stimson Center and the Carnegie Endowment.)

What happened next

The Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue never formally began. After the Uri attack of September 2016, India boycotted the SAARC summit in Islamabad, and relations deteriorated further after Pulwama and Balakot (2019), the revocation of Article 370 (2019) and the May 2025 conflict. Only limited steps, such as the Kartarpur Corridor (2019) and the 2021 LoC ceasefire, survived.

Conclusion

The Lahore Declaration of 1999 stated that the two governments were "convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries." The Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue offered a chance to make progress on Sir Creek, Siachen, trade, visas, CBMs and even Kashmir. But terrorism, the Kashmir dispute, preconditions, domestic politics and deep mistrust prevented it from taking off. Lasting progress requires a dialogue that is uninterrupted, comprehensive and backed by the political will of both nations.